الباب الأول: في تعريف العلم وتقسيمه وتعليمهBab 01 Fasl 01 — Nature of Knowledge

Book One: On Defining, Classifying, and Teaching Knowledge

Chapter One: On the Nature of Knowledge

Disagreement Concerning the Nature of Knowledge in General

Know that there has been disagreement over whether conceiving the nature of knowledge in general is self-evident, such that its essence is conceived completely and it cannot be defined; theoretical, such that defining it is difficult; or theoretical, yet not difficult to define.

The first is the position of a group, including Imaam al-Raazee.[Edition footnote 1] They supported it with arguments that contain no proof. It is sufficient to refute what they said that every rational person knows by direct awareness that knowledge is divided into necessary and acquired knowledge.

The second is the view of a group, including Imaam al-Haramayn[Edition footnote 2] and al-Ghazaalee. They said that there is no way to know it except through division and example. This view has been examined critically, as our shaykh al-Shawkaanee explained in Irshaad al-Fuhool.

The third is the preponderant view, adopted by the majority.

They then mentioned definitions of it:

First: Some Mu'tazilite theologians defined it as “believing a thing as it is.” This is defective because it includes correct imitation that accords with reality. A qualification was therefore added: “on the basis of necessity or proof.” Yet this does not exclude a predominant belief that accords with reality, namely, an opinion arising from necessity or proof. In other words, it is that which gives the one who possesses it the name “knower,” and it excludes knowledge of the impossible, since, by agreement, the impossible is not a thing.

[Edition footnote 1] He is Fakhr al-Deen al-Raazee, Muhammad ibn 'Umar ibn al-Hasan ibn al-Husayn al-Taymee al-Bakree, the imaam and exegete, peerless in his age in rational and transmitted disciplines and the sciences of the ancients. He was Qurashee by lineage, originally from Tabarsistaan, born in Rayy, and named after it. He left many famous works: 544–606 AH = 1150–1210 CE.

[Edition footnote 2] He is 'Abd al-Malik ibn 'Abd Allaah ibn Yoosuf ibn Muhammad al-Juwaynee, known as Imaam al-Haramayn, the most learned of the later scholars and a follower of al-Shaafi'ee. The vizier Nidhaam al-Mulk built a school for him in Nishapur. The greatest scholars attended his lessons. He left many works: 419–478 AH = 1028–1085 CE.

* * *

[Printed page 31]

Second: “Knowing the known as it is.” This too is defective: it excludes God's knowledge, since it is not called “knowledge of” in the technical sense—or, by consensus, either linguistically or technically. It also mentions “the known,” which is derived from “knowledge,” making the definition circular. Moreover, “as it is” has the same meaning as “knowledge,” rendering it superfluous. This is the definition preferred by Qaadhee Aboo Bakr al-Baaqillaanee.[Edition footnote 3]

Third: “That which makes the one who possesses it a knower.” This too is defective, because it mentions “knower” in the definition of knowledge, making it circular.

Fourth: “Perceiving the known as it is.” This is the definition of Shaykh Aboo al-Hasan al-Ash'aree. It too is defective because it contains the circularity and redundancy mentioned above, and because “perception” is a metaphor for knowledge.

Fifth: “That by which the one who possesses it can perfect an act.” This is the view of Ibn Foorak.[Edition footnote 4] It includes power and excludes our knowledge, since power has no role in making perfection possible: our acts are not brought into existence by us. It also excludes some objects of knowledge that the knower cannot perfect, such as the impossible.

Sixth: “Clarifying the known as it is.” This contains the aforementioned redundancy and circularity. Moreover, “clarification” suggests appearance after concealment, and thus excludes God's knowledge.

Seventh: “Establishing the known as it is.” This contains the redundancy and circularity. In addition, “establishing” may be used metaphorically for knowledge, which would entail defining a thing by itself.

Eighth: “Being certain that the known is as it is.” This contains the redundancy and circularity. It would also entail that the Creator is “certain” of what He knows, which cannot properly be attributed to Him in religious usage.

Ninth: “A resolute belief corresponding to its basis, whether necessity or proof.” This excludes conception, since conception does not fall under belief, even though it is knowledge. It also excludes God's knowledge, because belief is not attributed to Him and His knowledge is not based upon necessity or proof. This is Fakhr al-Raazee's definition, which he gave after abandoning the view that knowledge is self-evident.

Tenth: “The presence of a thing's form in the intellect,” or “the form present to the intellect.” This includes opinion, compound ignorance, imitation, doubt, and conjecture. Ibn Sadr al-Deen said: This is the soundest definition according to the investigators among the philosophers and some theologians. I say: Applying the name “knowledge” to these conflicts with the meaning of knowledge linguistically, technically, customarily, and religiously, since in none of these usages is a person who is compoundly ignorant, opining, doubting, or conjecturing about something called knowledgeable of it. As for imitation, it may be called knowledge metaphorically, and there is no objection to terminology. What is discussed in logic is knowledge in this sense, because logic consists in collecting the laws of acquisition, and therefore its practitioners must generalize the term knowledge. This is stated in Kashshaaf Istilaahaat al-Funoon.

Eleventh: “The representation of the essence of the apprehended in the self of the apprehender.” This contains what the tenth definition contains. These two definitions belong to the philosophers and express mental existence; according to them, knowledge consists in this. The first includes apprehension of universals and particulars, while the apparent meaning of the second restricts it to universals.

[Edition footnote 3] He is Qaadhee Muhammad ibn al-Tayyib ibn Muhammad ibn Ja'far, one of the leading theologians. Authority in the Ash'aree school ultimately came to him. Born in Basra, he settled and died in Baghdad, leaving many books: 338–403 AH = 950–1013 CE.

[Edition footnote 4] He is Muhammad ibn al-Hasan ibn Foorak al-Ansaaree al-Isfahaanee, Aboo Bakr, a scholar of legal theory and theology and one of the Shaafi'ee jurists. He taught in Nishapur, where he built a school, and died near it. He left many books and died in 406 AH = 1015 CE.

* * *

[Printed page 32]

Twelfth: “A quality that gives its locus a discrimination between meanings that cannot admit the contrary.” This is the definition preferred by the theologians. Kashshaaf Istilaahaat al-Funoon says: That is, because it is free of the defects mentioned in the other definitions and includes conception together with certain assent. End quote.

I say: Nevertheless, it excludes customary knowledge—for example, our knowledge that the mountain we previously saw has not yet turned into gold—because such knowledge admits the contrary, since a breach of customary order is possible. This has been answered in its proper place. A qualification may be added, “between universal meanings,” but besides being unnecessary, that would exclude knowledge of particulars. This is the preferred definition among those who say that knowledge is a quality related to the known.

Thirteenth: “Discriminating a meaning in the self with a discrimination that cannot in any respect admit the contrary.” This is the definition preferred by those theologians who say that knowledge is the particular relation between the knower and the known. Its problem is that knowledge based on custom admits the contrary, since God's power can breach customary order.

Fourteenth: “A quality through which the mentioned becomes manifest to the one in whom it subsists.” The eminent al-Shareef[Edition footnote 5] said: This is the best statement concerning the disclosure of the nature of knowledge, because “the mentioned” includes the existent and nonexistent, the possible and impossible, without disagreement, and includes the simple and composite, the universal and particular. Manifestation is complete disclosure.

The meaning is that it is a quality through which whatever is capable of being mentioned becomes completely disclosed, without ambiguity, to the one in whom the quality subsists. This excludes opinion, compound ignorance, and even the correct belief of an imitator, because in reality it is a knot tied upon the heart; it does not contain complete disclosure and an expansion that would undo the knot. End quote.

It may be objected that this excludes sense perception, since the mentioned has no role in it if “mentioned” is intended in the linguistic sense, as is apparent. If it is intended to include both mentioning with a fatha on the meem and remembrance with a dhamma on it, then this must either be a combination of the meanings of a homonym or a combination of literal and metaphorical meanings, both of which are avoided in definitions.

Fifteenth: “The presence of a meaning in the self in such a manner that the self cannot entertain the possibility that it is other than the manner in which it is present.” This is al-Aamidee's definition.[Edition footnote 6] He said: By “the presence of a meaning in the self,” we mean its being distinguished in the self from everything else. It includes knowledge through affirmation and negation, and simple and composite knowledge, while it excludes beliefs, since it is not impossible for the self to entertain the possibility that what is believed or supposed is other than the manner in which it is present. End quote.

Sixteenth: “A judgment whose two terms—that is, the subject and predicate—cannot admit its contrary.” This excludes conception, although conception is knowledge.

Seventeenth: “A quality through which the apprehended, in the objective sense, becomes manifest to the apprehender, in the subjective sense.” This resembles the tenth definition. Its problem is that “apprehension” is a metaphor for knowledge, which entails defining a thing by itself, while metaphor is avoided in definitions and the claim that this usage is established in the broader meaning that is the genus of the narrower meaning is unproven.

[Edition footnote 5] al-Jurjaanee; he was introduced earlier, on page 23.

[Edition footnote 6] He is 'Alee ibn Muhammad ibn Saalim al-Taghlibee, Aboo al-Hasan, Sayf al-Deen, a scholar of legal theory and investigator, who wrote works on legal theory and theology. He died in Damascus in 631 AH = 1233 CE.

* * *

[Printed page 33]

These are all the statements that have been made in defining knowledge, and you have seen the objections raised against each of them. Our shaykh, the learned and godly judge Muhammad ibn 'Alee al-Shawkaanee, God have mercy on him, said in Irshaad al-Fuhool ilaa Tahqeeq al-Haqq min 'Ilm al-Usool: “In my view, the preferable formulation for defining it is: 'A quality through which the desired object becomes completely disclosed.' None of the foregoing objections applies to this. Reflect upon it.” End quote.

Kashshaaf Istilaahaat al-Funoon goes into considerable and useful detail in presenting the first seven views on the definition of knowledge. Reproducing that discussion is not among our purposes in this abridgment. If you wish to go beyond this, consult it and its sources.

* * *

[Printed page 34]