الفصل الخامس: في بيان تقسم العلوم المدونة وما يتعلق بهاBab 01 Fasl 05 — Classification of Codified Sciences

Chapter Five: On the Classification of Codified Sciences and Related Matters

Codified sciences are those that have been set down in books, such as morphology, grammar, logic, philosophy, and the like.

Know that the scholars disagreed. Some said that it is not a condition of a person's being learned in a science that he know it by proof. Others said that this is a condition, so that even if someone knows it without taking a proof, he is called a transmitter, not a scholar. This is indicated by the words of the muhaqqiq 'Abd al-Hakeem[Edition footnote 1] in his marginalia on al-Fawaa'id al-Dhiyaa'iyya, where he said: Whoever says that knowledge consists in knowing demonstrated problems makes knowledge of undemonstrated problems a transmission of the problems of the sciences. Whoever says that it consists in the problems themselves makes it knowledge. End quote.

With regard to the first position, the aforementioned muhaqqiq said in his marginalia on al-Khayaalee that knowledge may be applied to assent to the problems, to the problems themselves, or to the disposition acquired through them. Likewise, when one says, “I wrote down so-and-so's knowledge,” or “I heard it,” or “It is confined to eight chapters,” for example, this is the second meaning. It may also be understood in the first meaning without difficulty, because, customarily, codifying the sciences follows codifying knowledge. As for codifying the disposition, sound taste rejects that. End quote.

When it is said, “So-and-so knows grammar,” for example, this does not mean that all its problems are present in his mind. Rather, it means that he has a simple, general state that is the source of the details of its problems, through which he can recall them. Thus, what is meant here by knowledge related to grammar is the disposition, even though grammar consists of the problems. This is understood from al-Mutawwal and its marginalia.

1 al-Siyaalkootee; his biography was given earlier on page 38.

* * *

[Printed page 42]

* * *

With regard to the second position, the author of al-Atwal[Edition footnote 1] said in defining the science of meanings: The names of codified sciences, such as the science of meanings, are applied to apprehending the rules by proof. Even if someone apprehends them by imitation, he is not called a scholar but a transmitter. al-Sayyid al-Sanad[Edition footnote 2] mentioned this in his commentary on al-Miftaah. They may also be applied to what is known through them, namely the rules, provided that they are known by proof, even if they use the expression without this qualification; and to the disposition acquired by apprehending the rules repeatedly, meaning the disposition to recall them whenever desired. But this is so only when it is a disposition for apprehending them by proof, even if they use the expression without that qualification, as is clear from restricting the name to apprehension by proof. Likewise, the word knowledge is applied to these three meanings. Yet al-Sayyid al-Sanad established that, for apprehension, it is literal; for the disposition, which depends on apprehension for its acquisition and serves as a means to it for its continuance, and for the object of apprehension, namely the problems, it is either customary or technical literal usage, or a well-known metaphor. There is, however, a question about its being literal for apprehension, because what is intended is apprehension by proof, not apprehension without qualification, such that it would be literal. End quote.

Aboo al-Qaasim[Edition footnote 3] said in his marginalia on al-Mutawwal: If the names of codified sciences are applied equally to the principles and rules, their apprehension, and the disposition acquired, and the word knowledge is likewise used, that is sound. They also said that what is appropriate here is to understand disposition as a state of the soul by which one is able to know all the problems: through it one recalls what was already known and stored, and acquires what was unknown—not merely the disposition to recall, which is called the intellect in act,

since it is apparent that whoever is able to know all the problems of a science, by possessing what suffices to acquire them, is counted as learned in that science without requiring knowledge of all of them, much less their becoming stored. Nor is it merely the disposition to acquire, called the intellect in potential, for that would entail counting as learned one who possesses that disposition while having acquired none of the problems. The intended disposition is therefore broader than the disposition to recall and the disposition to acquire.

Al-Atwal says: What is intended is the disposition to recall, not disposition without qualification. That no one attains the whole of a codified science, while it increases day by day, is neither impossible nor unlikely, for the impossibility of knowing everything does not conflict with the science's being a cause of such knowledge. Calling some people jurists, grammarians, or philosophers is an allusion to their high standing in that science, as though they had acquired all of it. In short, the disposition to acquire is not knowledge; the question is whether the disposition to recall most of the problems together with the disposition to acquire the remainder is knowledge or not. Whoever wishes the application of “jurist” to the imams to be literal despite their inability to answer some legal opinions must accept that position. On the path we have followed, namely that the application is metaphorical, this is not required.

Know also that although knowledge is one meaning and one reality, it is divided into many categories from different perspectives. From one perspective it is divided into pre-eternal and originated; with respect to its object, into conception and assent; and with respect to its methods, into three categories: one established in the soul, one perceived through the senses, and one known through syllogism. With respect to the differences among its subjects, it is divided into many categories, some called sciences and others crafts. We have included what the authors of works on subjects have mentioned in enumerating these categories:

1 He is Sa'd al-Deen Mas'ood ibn 'Umar al-Taftaazaanee, who died in 792 AH.

2 He is al-Shareef al-Jurjaanee; his biography was given earlier on page 23.

3 He is Aboo al-Qaasim ibn Abee Bakr al-Laythee al-Samarqandee, one of the commentators on al-Taftaazaanee's al-Mutawwal.

* * *

[Printed page 43]

* * *

The First Classification:

This is what the author of Kashshaaf Istilaahaat al-Funoon[Edition footnote 1] mentioned: Know that here—that is, in the context of classifying codified sciences, which are either the problems or assent to them—there are classifications, as found in some marginalia on Sharh al-Mataali'. al-Sayyid al-Sanad said that, in the sense of the disposition of apprehension, they encompass theoretical sciences.

First: Sciences are either theoretical, meaning not related to the manner of an action, or practical, meaning related to it. Logic, practical philosophy, practical medicine, and the science of sewing all fall under the practical, because all are related to the manner of an action, whether mental, as in logic, or external, as in medicine. To clarify, practical and theoretical are used in three senses:

First, in the classification of sciences without qualification, as stated above.

Second, in the classification of philosophy. There, practical is knowledge of what exists through our power and choice, while theoretical is knowledge of what does not exist through our power and choice.

Third, in the classification of crafts: a craft is practical when its acquisition depends on practicing the work, and theoretical when its acquisition does not depend on practicing the work but only on reflection. On this basis, jurisprudence, grammar, logic, practical philosophy, and theoretical medicine fall outside the practical, since their acquisition does not require practicing actions, unlike the sciences of sewing, weaving, and cupping, which depend on practice.

Practical in the first sense is broader than practical in the classification of philosophy, because it includes what relates to the manner of a mental action, such as logic, whereas practical in the classification of philosophy does not include it, since that practical science investigates the states of what our choice has any role in bringing into existence, whether mental or external. The subject of logic is second intelligibles, which do not correspond to anything external; their mental existence is not within our power, so they do not fall under practical in this sense.

Practical in the classification of crafts is narrower than practical in both senses, because it is a division of craft, defined as knowledge related to the manner of action, whether or not it is acquired through practice. Practical in the first sense is craft itself; in the second sense it is narrower than the first, but broader than this third sense, since there is no practice in the second, unlike the third.

Second: Sciences are either instrumental or non-instrumental. Either a science is not, in itself, an instrument for acquiring something else, but is sought for its own sake, or it is an instrument for something else and is not sought for its own sake. The latter are called instrumental and the former non-instrumental. Being an instrument in itself does not mean that instrumentality is essential, since instrumentality attaches to a thing only in relation to something else; what is relational is not essential. Rather, it means that the science is such in itself that, when related to what it serves as an instrument for, instrumentality attaches to it without requiring anything else. This is like intrinsic possibility, which attaches to a thing only in relation to existence. They are called instrumental because they contain instruments: an instrumental science has problems, each of which provides access to what it serves as an instrument for. This is the more evident view, since not every entire science provides access to another science.

1 He is al-Tahaanawee, Muhammad 'Alee ibn 'Alee ibn Muhammad al-Faarooqee al-Hanafee al-Tahaanawee, an Indian scholar who died after 1158 AH = 1745 CE.

* * *

[Printed page 44]

* * *

Know then that the outcome of the two classifications is one, for they are inseparable. Whatever is, in itself, an instrument for acquiring something else must be related to the manner of acquiring it. It is therefore related to the manner of an action, and whatever is related to the manner of an action must itself be an instrument for acquiring something else. Thus the meaning of instrumental returns to the meaning of practical. Similarly, whatever is not an instrument for something else is not related to the manner of an action, and whatever is not related to the manner of an action is not, in itself, an instrument for something else. Thus the meaning of theoretical and non-instrumental returns to one thing.

Know also that the purpose—that is, the final cause—of instrumental sciences is the acquisition of something else, because they relate to and explain the manner of an action. What is sought from them is the performance of the action, whether that action is sought for its own sake or for another matter that is the ultimate purpose of those sciences. The purpose of non-instrumental sciences is their own acquisition, because they are sought for their own sake. Even if other benefits may result from them, the possibility, or even occurrence, of such accidental ordering does not conflict with the thing resulting from it being sought for its own sake; what conflicts with that is intending the result. The point is that what is meant by purpose is the intrinsic purpose intended by the inventor and codifier, not the purpose that prompted the author to begin writing. The author's motive for beginning instrumental sciences may be their own acquisition, and in non-instrumental sciences it may be something additional to them. If it is said: The purpose of a thing is its cause, and it is inconceivable for a thing to be the cause of itself, so how can the purpose of non-instrumental sciences be their own acquisition? The answer is that purpose is used in two ways. First, it is annexed to the action, which is more common: one says, “The purpose of this action is such-and-such,” in which case the purpose follows from the thing possessing the purpose and is its cause. Second, it is annexed to the object: one says, “The purpose of what was done is such-and-such,” in which case the purpose follows from the action and is its cause, not the cause of the thing possessing the purpose—that is, not of what the purpose is annexed to. Purpose here belongs to the second category, because what the purpose is annexed to is the object, namely the sciences acquired, not the action, namely acquisition. Their purpose therefore means what follows from acquiring them and is its cause, not the cause of the sciences themselves. This is all summarized from Sharh al-Mataali' and its marginalia.

Third: sciences are divided into Arabic and non-Arabic.

Fourth: into religious and non-religious.

Fifth: into real and non-real.

Sixth: into rational and transmitted. Rational sciences do not require transmission; transmitted sciences are the opposite.

Seventh: into particular and non-particular sciences. Sciences whose subjects are narrower than the subject of another science are called particular sciences, such as medicine, whose subject—human being—is narrower than the subject of natural philosophy. Those whose subjects are broader are called the prior science, because the broader is prior to the narrower for the intellect: apprehension of the broader precedes apprehension of the narrower. This is stated in Bahr al-Jawaahir.[Edition footnote 1]

1 Kashshaaf Istilaahaat al-Funoon, 3–4; Bahr al-Jawaahir is a medical work in Persian by Muhammad Yoosuf al-Harawee; see Eedhaah al-Maknoon, 1/164.

* * *

[Printed page 45]

* * *

The Second Classification:

This belongs to the illustrious al-Hafeed.[Edition footnote 1] Codified sciences are of two types.

The first is what the adherents of revealed law codified to explain the wording and chains of transmission of the Qur'aan or Prophetic Sunnah; to reveal what was intended by the Qur'aan in interpretation and exegesis; to establish what is derived from them, namely foundational doctrinal rulings or subsidiary practical rulings; to determine the principles through which those subsidiary rulings are inferred; or to codify what plays a role in extracting those meanings from the Book and Sunnah, namely the literary sciences.

The second type is what the philosophers codified to determine things as they are and the manner of acting in accordance with their intellects. End quote.

He included among the sciences of the adherents of revealed law the science of recitation, hadith, its principles, exegesis, kalaam, jurisprudence, its principles, and literature. He said: This is what is well known among the majority, but the spiritual elite among the Sufis have a science called Sufism. The science of disputation, the science of disagreement, and dialectic remain; it is not apparent that they belong among the sciences of the adherents of revealed law or the sciences of the philosophers. One cannot say that disagreement and dialectic are apparently branches of disputation, named as such in the way inheritance law is named in relation to jurisprudence, for we say: The purpose of disputation is to reveal the truth, while the purpose of dialectic and disagreement is to compel an opponent. Moreover, the adherents of revealed law wrote works on disagreement and built the problems of jurisprudence upon it, while the codification of it by the sages is not known. It is therefore more appropriate to count it among the religious sciences. The sages based their discussions on disputation, but did not codify the science of disputation among themselves. End quote.

The Third Classification:

This is what is mentioned in al-Fawaa'id al-Khaaqaaniyya: Know that there are two well-known classifications here.

One is that sciences are either theoretical, meaning not related to the manner of an action, or practical, meaning related to it.

The other is that sciences are either not, in themselves, instruments for acquiring something else, but are sought for their own sake and called non-instrumental, or are instruments for something else and not sought for their own sake, and called instrumental. Their outcome is one. Whatever is, in itself, an instrument for acquiring something else must be related to the manner of an action, and whatever is related to the manner of an action must itself be an instrument for acquiring something else. Thus the meaning of instrumental returns to the meaning of practical. Likewise, whatever is not an instrument for something else is not related to the manner of an action, and whatever is not related to the manner of an action is not, in itself, an instrument for something else. Thus the meaning of theoretical and non-instrumental returns to one thing.

Theoretical and practical are then used in three senses.

First, in the classification of sciences without qualification, as we mentioned. Logic, practical philosophy, practical medicine, and the science of sewing all fall under the practical in question, because all are related to the manner of an action, whether mental, as in logic, or external, as in medicine.

1 He is Ahmad ibn Yahyaa ibn Muhammad al-Harawee, known as the grandson of al-Taftaazaanee, a scholar who wrote marginalia on al-Taftaazaanee's al-Mutawwal. He died in 916 AH = 1510 CE.

* * *

[Printed page 46]

* * *

Second, in the classification of philosophy. After defining philosophy as knowledge of the states of existent things as they are in reality, to the extent of human capacity, they said: Those existents are either actions and works whose existence is through our power and choice, or not. Knowledge of the states of the former, insofar as it leads to the betterment of livelihood and the hereafter, is called practical philosophy; knowledge of the states of the latter is called theoretical philosophy.

Third, in what is mentioned in the classification of craft—that is, knowledge related to the manner of an action—namely, that it is either practical, whose acquisition depends on practicing the work, or theoretical, whose acquisition does not depend on practice. Jurisprudence, grammar, logic, practical philosophy, and theoretical medicine fall outside the practical in this sense, since their acquisition does not require practicing actions, unlike sewing, weaving, and cupping, whose acquisition depends on practice.

The Fourth Classification:

This is also mentioned there: Know that knowledge is divided into philosophical and non-philosophical. The latter is divided into religious and non-religious, and the religious into praiseworthy, blameworthy, and permissible. The basis of the division is whether it changes with places and times and varies with the change of states and religions, as does knowledge of the configuration of the celestial spheres, or not.

The first is philosophical knowledge, also called real knowledge, meaning knowledge that remains constant through ages and years.

The second is either connected to revelation and derived from the prophets, peace be upon them, without depending on experience, hearing, or anything else, or it is not.

The first is religious knowledge, also called revealed knowledge.

The second is non-religious knowledge, such as medicine, because it is necessary for the preservation of bodies, and arithmetic, because it is necessary for transactions, the division of bequests and inheritances, and the like. It is praiseworthy. Otherwise, if it has no good consequence, it is blameworthy, such as magic, talismans, legerdemain, and deceptions. Otherwise, it is permissible, such as poetry in which there is no vulgarity, histories of the prophets, peace be upon them, and what resembles them. This difference concerns the purposes; otherwise, knowledge, insofar as it is knowledge, is an undeniable virtue and is not blameworthy. Knowledge of everything is preferable to ignorance of it, so beware of being among the ignorant.

The Fifth Classification:

This is what the author of Shifaa' al-Mutaalim[Edition footnote 1] mentioned: Every science is either sought for its own sake or not.

The first is philosophical knowledge, which is either something learned so that it may be believed—this is theoretical philosophy—or something learned so that it may be acted upon—this is practical philosophy.

The first is divided into the highest, namely theology; the lowest, namely natural philosophy; and the middle, namely mathematics. For reflection is either on matters abstracted from matter, or on material matters in the mind and outside it—this is natural philosophy—or on matters that can be abstracted from matter in the mind only—this is mathematics. Mathematics has four divisions, because its investigation is either of what can be supposed to have parts meeting at a common boundary, or not; and each of these is either permanent in essence or not. The first is:

1 This is the book Shifaa' al-Mutaalim fee Aadaab al-Mu'allim wa-l-Muta'allim by Shaykh 'Abd al-Lateef ibn 'Abd al-Rahmaan al-Maqdisee, who died in 856 AH.

* * *

[Printed page 47]

* * *

geometry; the second, astronomy; the third, arithmetic; and the fourth, music.

Practical philosophy has two divisions: political science and ethics, because reflection either concerns the state of the human being or not. The second is the former. Reflection on it is either concerned with reforming all people in matters of livelihood and the hereafter—in which case it returns to revealed law and its sciences, which are known—or with social concord and the administration of human affairs, in which case it is governmental law, namely politics. If it concerns a particular group, it is household management.

The second is what is not sought for its own sake, but is an instrument through which protection from error in something else is sought. It is either what provides protection from error in meanings, or what leads to apprehending them through speech or writing. The first is logic, and the second is literature. What investigates linguistic indications or rhetorical indications is, in the second case, calligraphy. The first is either concerned with individual indications, composite indications, or both. If it concerns individual expressions, it is lexicography; if it concerns their forms, it is morphology. The second is either concerned with measured speech or not. If it concerns the divisions of verses, it is rhyme; otherwise, it is prosody. If it provides protection from error in conveying the basic meaning, it is grammar; otherwise, it is rhetoric. The third is eloquence. Rhetoric is the science that protects from error in applying speech to the requirements of the situation; when it concerns types of indication and knowing whether they are obscure or clear, it is the science of exposition. Eloquence, when concerned with protection from error in arranging individual expressions with respect to refinement, is the science of rhetorical embellishment.

The Sixth Classification:

This is what the author of al-Miftaah[Edition footnote 1] mentioned, and it is the best of all: Know that things have existence at four levels: in writing, in expression, in minds, and in external entities. Each earlier level is a means to the later, for writing indicates words, words indicate what is in minds, and what is in minds indicates what is in external entities. External existence is the true, original existence. There is disagreement over whether mental existence is real or metaphorical, but the first two are certainly metaphorical. Knowledge related to the first three is necessarily instrumental. Knowledge related to external entities is either practical, in which its own acquisition is not intended but something else is, or theoretical, in which its own acquisition is intended. Each of these is then either investigated insofar as it is taken from revealed law, in which case it is religious knowledge, or insofar as it is required by reason alone, in which case it is philosophical knowledge. These are the seven foundations. Each has types, and its types have branches. According to the effort we have made in examining and investigating them by their subjects and names, and in tracing the works written on them, the total reaches one hundred and fifty types, and perhaps I will add to this later. End quote.

He arranged his book into seven bowers, one for each foundation, and gave each bower branches to explain its subdivisions.

Among what he included in the first—the sciences of writing—are the science of the tools of writing; the science of the rules of writing; the science of improving letters; the science of how scripts arise from their basic forms; the science of arranging the letters of the alphabet; the science of composing the forms of the simple letters; the science of Arabic orthography; the science of Qur'aanic script; and the science of prosodic writing.

In the second he mentioned the sciences related to expressions: the science of the articulation points of letters; lexicography; the science of conventional assignment; and

1 This is the book Miftaah al-Sa'aada wa-Misbaah al-Siyaada by Ahmad ibn Mustafaa, known as Taashkubreezaada.

* * *

[Printed page 48]

* * *

etymology; morphology; grammar; meanings; exposition; rhetorical embellishment; prosody; rhyme; versification; the principles of poetry; composition; the principles and tools of composition; conversation; chancery studies; and chronology.

Among the branches of the Arabic sciences he included the science of proverbs; the events and customs of nations; the uses of expressions; epistolary writing; legal instruments and registers; riddles and fallacies; puzzles; enigmas; cryptograms; textual alterations; inversions; paronomasia; conversation with kings; accounts of the righteous; reports of the prophets, peace be upon them; campaigns and biographies; the history of the caliphs; the classes of reciters; the classes of exegetes; the classes of hadith transmitters; the biographies of the Companions; the classes of Shaafi'ee jurists; the classes of Hanafee jurists; the classes of Maalikee jurists; the classes of Hanbalee jurists; the classes of grammarians; and the classes of physicians.

In the third he mentioned the sciences investigating what is in minds, namely second intelligibles: logic; the etiquette of study; dialectical examination; dialectic; and disagreement.

In the fourth he mentioned the sciences related to external entities: theology, natural philosophy, and the mathematical sciences, which are four: arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music.

Among the branches of theology he included knowledge of the human soul; knowledge of the angelic soul; knowledge of the return; knowledge of the signs of prophethood; and knowledge of the doctrines of sects.

Among the branches of natural philosophy he included medicine; veterinary medicine; falconry; botany; zoology; agriculture; mineralogy; gemology; generation and corruption; rainbows; physiognomy; dream interpretation; astrology; magic; talismans; simiyaa'; and alchemy.

Among the branches of medicine he included anatomy; ophthalmology; foods; pharmacology; the preparation of drinks and electuaries; removing stains from clothes; the composition of kinds of ink; surgery; bloodletting; cupping; measures and weights; and sexual medicine.

Among the branches of physiognomy he included knowledge of moles and birthmarks; facial lines; shoulder-blade divination; tracking by traces; physiognomy of human beings; finding one's way through deserts and wastelands; water divining; deduction; forecasting rainfall; soothsaying; and involuntary twitching.

Among the branches of astrology he included elections; geomancy; sortilege; and augury.

Among the branches of magic he included divination; niranjaat; occult properties; incantations; spells; summoning; invocation of the stars; qalfuteeraat; concealment; Sasanian stratagems; discovering hidden things; sleight of hand; influencing the heart; and seeking assistance through the occult properties of medicines.

Among the branches of geometry he included architectural vaulting; optical reflection; burning mirrors; centers of gravity; lifting weights; surveying; locating water; military machines; archery; and adjustment.

* * *

[Printed page 49]

* * *

He also included the science of water clocks; navigation; swimming; weights and balances; and machines based on the necessity of the void's nonexistence.

Among the branches of astronomy he included astronomical tables and calendars; stellar computation; writing calendars; the manner of observations; observational instruments; timekeeping; shadow instruments; spheres; moving spheres; projection of the sphere; celestial maps; the magnitudes of the heavenly bodies; lunar mansions; geography; the routes of countries; postal routes and their distances; the properties of regions; cycles and epochs; conjunctions; apocalyptic battles; seasons; prayer times; the construction of the astrolabe; the operation of the astrolabe; the construction of the sine quadrant and astrolabe quadrants; the operation of the quadrant; and clock instruments.

Among the branches of arithmetic he included reckoning with the board and dust; algebra and restoration; double false position; reckoning of cycles and bequests; reckoning of dirhams and dinars; inheritance arithmetic; reckoning with air; reckoning contracts on the fingers; amicable numbers; occult properties of numbers; and numerical talismans.

Among the branches of music he included marvelous instruments; dancing; and coquettish movement.

In the fifth he mentioned the practical philosophical sciences: ethics; household management; and politics.

Among the branches of practical philosophy he included the etiquette of kings; the etiquette of the vizierate; market supervision; and leading armies and troops.

In the sixth he mentioned the religious sciences:

the science of recitation; Qur'aanic exegesis; hadith transmission; hadith criticism; the principles of religion, called kalaam; the principles of jurisprudence; and jurisprudence.

Among the branches of recitation he included anomalous readings; the articulation points of letters; the articulation points of expressions; stopping rules; the causes of Qur'aanic revelation; the orthography of the Qur'aan; and the etiquette of writing the mushaf.

Among the branches of hadith he included hadith commentary; the occasions and times of hadith narration; abrogating and abrogated hadith; interpretation of the Prophet's statements, peace and blessings be upon him; the symbols and indications of hadith; rare hadith vocabulary; defending hadith against criticism; harmonizing hadiths; the states of hadith transmitters; and Prophetic medicine.

Among the branches of exegesis he included Meccan and Medinan revelation; urban and travel revelation; daytime and nighttime revelation; summer and winter revelation; bedouin and sleeping revelation; earthly and heavenly revelation; the first and last revelation; occasions of revelation; what was revealed through the tongue of some Companions—may God be pleased with them; repeated revelation; what had a ruling delayed after its revelation and what had its revelation delayed after its ruling; what was revealed separately and what was revealed together; what was revealed accompanied and what was revealed alone; what was revealed to some prophets and what was not revealed; how the Qur'aan was sent down; the names of the Qur'aan and the names of its sooras; its compilation and arrangement; the number of its sooras, verses, words, and letters; its memorizers and transmitters; the elevated and lower chains of transmission; the mutawaatir and well-known; explaining what is joined in wording and separated in meaning; imaala and fath; assimilation, clear pronunciation, concealment, and conversion; lengthening and shortening; easing the hamza; and the manner of

* * *

[Printed page 50]

* * *

transmitting the Qur'aan. He included the etiquette of reciting it and of its reciter; the permissibility of quotation; what occurs in it in a language other than the Hijazi language; what occurs in it in a language other than Arabic; rare Qur'aanic vocabulary; homonyms and their various senses; the meanings of the particles needed by the exegete; the clear and ambiguous; what precedes and follows in the Qur'aan; its general and particular; its abrogating and abrogated passages; difficult Qur'aanic passages; its absolute and qualified expressions; its explicit and understood meanings; its modes of address; the literal and metaphorical meanings of Qur'aanic expressions;

the similes and metaphors of the Qur'aan; its allusions and indirect expressions; restriction and specification; concision and amplification; informative and performative speech; the Qur'aan's rhetorical marvels; the endings of verses; the conclusions of sooras; the correspondence of verses and sooras; similar verses; the inimitability of the Qur'aan; the sciences inferred from the Qur'aan; the oaths of the Qur'aan; Qur'aanic dialectic; the names, teknonyms, and titles occurring in the Qur'aan; the unidentified persons and things of the Qur'aan; the virtues of the Qur'aan; the best and superior parts of the Qur'aan; the individual words of the Qur'aan; the special properties of the Qur'aan; written script and the etiquette of writing it; its exegesis, interpretation, and nobility; the conditions and etiquette of the exegete; rare points of exegesis; the classes of exegetes; the occult properties of letters; the spiritual properties of numerical talismans; letter-and-name transformations; luminous and dark letters; transformation through the Greatest Name; multiplication and expansion; the science of the zaayirja; jafr and the collection; and repelling objections to the Qur'aan.

Among the branches of hadith he included exhortations; supplications; reports; asceticism and scrupulousness; the prayer of needs; and military campaigns.

Among the branches of the principles of jurisprudence he included dialectical examination; disputation; and dialectic.

Among the branches of jurisprudence he included inheritance law; legal instruments and registers; judicial procedure; the ruling of legislation; and fatwas.

Thus all the sciences related to the method of reflection that he mentioned amount to three hundred and five sciences.

He then devoted the second part of his book to explaining the sciences related to purification, which is the fruit of acting upon knowledge. In it he abridged the work Ihyaa' 'Uloom al-Deen[Edition footnote 1] by Imam al-Ghazaalee and did not mention the science of Sufism. How excellent he is at diving into the seas of knowledge and bringing out their pearls!

If it is said that he intended to multiply the types of sciences and therefore included in their branches what he did—for example, in the branches of exegesis he included the types that al-Suyootee mentioned in al-Itqaan[Edition footnote 2]—why is it not objected that if by branches he means the aims of a science, medicine, for example, reaches thousands of sciences? If he means what has been separately codified, he did not exhaust the classifications in many fields that were separately codified, and omitted them, while also including among a science's branches what does not belong to it. I say: Yes, this objection applies, but even a champion may stumble, a young man may err; or, as they say: Do not count the slips of a learned man, and counterfeit enters the work of even the finest money-changers.

1 Ihyaa' 'Uloom al-Deen by Aboo Haamid al-Ghazaalee. Well known.

2 al-Itqaan fee 'Uloom al-Qur'aan by Jalaal al-Deen al-Suyootee.

* * *

[Printed page 51]

* * *

The Seventh Classification:

This belongs to the author of Madeenat al-'Uloom,[Edition footnote 1] and it appears at the beginning of the second section of this book. How well it accords with this classification—it is as though it were the same. Know that reviewing books, especially long ones, is easy compared with composing, arranging, and structuring them, as can be seen in great buildings and ancient structures, where a critic may fault their builder while being so devoid of strength and ability in his own craft that he cannot place one stone upon another.

This is my answer to what may be raised against my book as well. The master of eloquent scholars, the virtuous judge 'Abd al-Raheem al-Baysaanee, wrote to al-'Imaad al-Isfahaanee[Edition footnote 2], apologizing for something he had added as a correction to his work: Something occurred to me, and I do not know whether it occurred to you or not. Here I am, telling you about it. I have seen that no one writes a book on one day without saying on the next: “If this had been changed, it would have been better; if something had been added, it would have been preferable; if this had been placed earlier, it would have been superior; if this had been omitted, it would have been more beautiful.” This is one of the greatest lessons, and it demonstrates the prevalence of deficiency over the whole human race. End quote.

This is a brief apology for all the objections and criticisms in general. As for the details, they will appear at the place of each science, together with a fair and patient explanation; perhaps additional sciences will be added to those he mentioned by way of correction, through the enabling of the Bestower of keen insight and perceptive intellect.

1 Opposite this phrase in the margin of the original is a note reading: “The wording of Miftaah al-Sa'aada quoted in Kashf al-Dhunoon is often identical to the wording of Madeenat al-'Uloom, as though they were one and the same. It is not yet known whether they are two independent books or one. Whoever discovers this should correct this book and excuse its author. God knows best what is correct. Sayyid Dhoo al-Fiqaar Ahmad.

Perhaps the author intended Miftaah al-Sa'aada and wrote the name of the book Madeenat al-'Uloom by mistake. The discussion of the sixth and seventh classifications appears verbatim in the introduction to Hajjee Khaleefa's Kashf al-Dhunoon, in the discussion of the fifth classification in the section on the merit of classifying the sciences.”

2 al-Qaadhee al-Faadhil was 'Abd al-Raheem ibn 'Alee ibn al-Sa'eed al-Lakhmee, a vizier and one of the great men of letters. He was vizier to Sultan Salaah al-Deen al-Ayyoobee and died in 596 AH = 1200 CE.

Al-'Imaad was Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Isfahaanee, a historian and scholar of literature, one of the leading writers in Salaah al-Deen's time. He died in 597 AH = 1201 CE.

* * *

[Printed page 52]

* * *