الفصل السادس: في بيان أجزاء العلومBab 01 Fasl 06 — Constituent Parts of the Sciences

Chapter Six: On Explaining the Constituent Parts of the Sciences

They said: Every formally compiled science must contain three matters: its subject, its questions, and its principles. This statement is made with some latitude, for the reality of every science consists in its questions; the subject and principles are counted among its parts only because of their close connection to the questions, which are the intended object of the science.

As for the subject, they said: The subject of every science is that whose essential accidents are investigated in it. The explanation is this: human perfection consists in knowing the individual realities of existing things, by conceiving them and assenting to their states as they are, to the extent of human capacity. Since knowledge of them in their particularity is impossible, and, because of their change and alteration, would not yield an appreciable perfection even if it were possible, they took the universal concepts

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that are truly predicated of them, whether essentially or accidentally, and investigated their states insofar as those concepts apply to them. Thus knowledge of them in a universal respect would yield knowledge enduring forever. Since their states are numerous, and since ordering them is difficult because they are dispersed and intermingled, they considered the essential states of each concept, made them a distinct science by compilation, and called that concept the subject of that science, because the subjects of its questions revert to it. Thus every collection of states sharing a subject became a distinct science, differentiated in itself from another collection sharing another subject. Their sciences thereby became differentiated in themselves by their subjects. This is a matter of convention, for reason does not prevent every question from being regarded as a science in its own right and taught separately, nor does it prevent many questions not sharing one subject from being regarded as one science and compiled separately. The differentiation attained by the learner through the subject belongs, primarily, to the objects of knowledge and only secondarily to the sciences; the differentiation attained through definition is the reverse, if it is a definition of the science. If it is a definition of the object known, the difference is that the subject may not be considered.

They then generalized essential states, interpreting them as whatever is predicated of that concept either by virtue of itself, of its more general or coextensive part—for it has a particular connection with the thing insofar as it is among the states of its constituent—or of an external thing coextensive with it. This is so whether it encompasses all the individuals of that concept unqualifiedly, or together with its opposite in the relation of contrariety or of privation and possession, but not in the relation of affirmation and negation; for two opposites in the relation of affirmation and negation have no particular connection with one concept rather than another. This was done to limit dispersion as far as possible. They therefore established the states that encompass without qualification for the subject itself; those that encompass together with their opposites for its kinds; and those consequent upon an external coextensive thing for its essential accident. Those essential accidents, moreover, have essential accidents that encompass them without qualification or in opposition. Thus they established the accidents encompassing without qualification for the essential accidents themselves, and those encompassing in opposition for the kinds of those accidents; and likewise the accidents of those accidents. In reality, these accidents are qualifications of the accidents established for the subject and its kinds; but because of the abundance of their investigations, they were made predicates of the accidents.

This details what they said: to investigate essential accidents means to establish those accidents for the subject itself, for its kinds, for its essential accidents, for their kinds, or for the kinds of their essential accidents. By this, the objection is dispelled that there is no science in which states peculiar to minerals, plants, and animals are not investigated. For what is investigated in natural science is that body either possesses a nature, or possesses an instrumental or non-instrumental soul; these are among its essential accidents. Investigation of the states peculiar to the elements and to complete and incomplete compounds is merely a detailing and qualification of these accidents. Because this objection was thought difficult, it was said that what is meant by investigating essential accidents is predicating them of the subject of the science, as when the scholar of legal theory says, “The Book establishes the ruling with certainty”; or of its kinds, as when he says, “The imperative indicates obligation”; or of its essential accidents, as when he says, “It yields certainty”; or of the kinds of its essential accidents, as when he says, “A general expression from which an exception has been made yields probability.”

It was also said that the meaning of their statement, “its essential accidents are investigated in it,” is that the investigation reverts to them: its essential accidents are established for it; what is an essential accident of a kind is established for that kind; what is an essential accident of an essential accident is established for that accident; or what is an essential accident of a kind of essential accident is established for that kind. It is not hidden from you that this entails the inclusion of a particular science within a universal science, such as the science of the moving sphere within the science of the sphere, and the science of the sphere within natural science; for in them one investigates the essential accidents of the kind sphere, or of the natural body, or of its essential accident, or of the kind of its essential accident.

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Know, then, that the interpretation of essential states just mentioned belongs only to the view of the later scholars, who hold that what attaches to a thing through its more general part is among the essential accidents investigated in the science. They stated that an accident is an external predicate predicated of a thing, and that an essential accident is an external predicate that attaches to a thing by virtue of its essence, its terminus being the essence itself, as the capacity to apprehend unfamiliar things attaches to the human being through faculty; or attaches through its more general part, as spatial extension attaches to it because it is a body; or through its coextensive part, as speech attaches to it because it is rational; or through an external coextensive thing, as wonder attaches to it because it apprehends astonishing things.

What attaches to a thing through an external thing that is more specific, more general absolutely or in one respect, or through a dissimilar thing, is not called an essential accident; rather, it is called an extraneous accident.

In detail, accidents are six, because what occurs to a thing either occurs by virtue of itself, of one of its parts, or of something external to it, whether that external thing is coextensive with it, more general than it, more specific than it, or dissimilar to it. The first three are called essential accidents because they are ascribed to the essence of the thing to which they belong—that is, because their relation to the essence is strong: they attach without an intermediary, or through an intermediary having a special relation by priority or coextensiveness. The remainder are called extraneous accidents because they are not ascribed to the essence by a strong relation. The earlier scholars, however, held that what attaches through the more general part is among the extraneous accidents not investigated in that science. They defined an essential accident as an external predicate that attaches to a thing by virtue of itself or of what is coextensive with it, whether that is one of its parts or external to it.

It was said: this is preferable, because accidents attaching through the more general part encompass the subject and something other than it; hence they are not effects sought for the subject, for the effects sought are the determinate, particular accidents that occur to it by reason of its distinctive preparedness. Yet there is room for examination in counting without qualification an accident that occurs through a dissimilar thing among the extraneous accidents, since the universal science whose subject is natural body may investigate colours, even though they occur to it through its dissimilar constituent, namely the surface.

The precise account is that the purpose of every formally compiled science is to explain the states of its subject—that is, the states that exist in it and not in another, and whose existence in it is not mediated by a kind subsumed under it. What exists in another is not truly among its states, but among the states of something more general than it. What exists in it alone, but for which it is not prepared until it becomes a specific kind of its kinds, is truly among the states of that kind. These two states should therefore be investigated in two sciences whose subjects are respectively that more general and that more specific thing. This, as is evident, is a matter of convention.

The states established for the subject in the manner described are of two kinds. The first is what is an accident of it and is not an accident of anything else except through it; this is the primary accident. The second is what is an accident of another thing, yet has a connection with that subject such that its occurring to that other thing entails its occurring to the subject; that other thing must not exist outside the subject, whether it is internal to it or external to it, either coextensive with it in predication, or dissimilar to it in predication but coextensive with it in existence. The correct view is therefore to suffice, with respect to the external thing, with unqualified coextensiveness, whether in predication or in existence. For if a dissimilar thing inheres in the subject while being coextensive with it in existence, and an accident occurs to that thing—truly occurring to it, though predicated of the subject—that accident is among the states sought in that science, because it is established for the subject in the manner described.

Know also that what is sought in a science is to establish the facticity of those states—that is, their being established for the subject—whether or not their why, namely the cause of their being established for it, is known.

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Know also that what is considered in the primary accident is the absence of an intermediary in occurrence, not the absence of an intermediary in establishment, which is broader. Evidence for this is their explicit statement that the surface is among the primary accidents of mathematical body, even though its establishment is through the body's termination and discontinuity; likewise, the line is so related to the surface, and the point to the line.

They also explicitly stated that colours are established for surfaces primarily and essentially, even though these accidents have emanated upon their loci from the Emanating Principle. Accordingly, what is considered in the opposite of the primary accident—that is, the remaining divisions—is the presence of an intermediary in occurrence.

If you desire further discussion beyond what we have mentioned, consult Sharh al-Mataali' and its marginal commentaries, as well as other books of logic.

Benefit. They said: many things may be the subject of one science, but not without qualification; rather, on condition of their proportionality, namely that they share either an essential feature, as the line, the surface, and mathematical body do in geometry, since they share the genus quantity; or an accidental feature, as the human body, its parts, foods, medicines, elements, temperaments, and the like, when they are made the subjects of medicine, since they share in being related to health, which is the ultimate end of that science.

Benefit. They said: one thing cannot be the subject of two sciences. Sadr al-Sharee'a [Edition footnote 1] said: this is not impossible, for one thing has diverse accidents, and in each science some of them are investigated. Do you not see that they made the bodies of the world, namely the simple bodies, the subject of astronomy with respect to figure, and the subject of the science of heaven and the world with respect to nature? Yet this is open to examination.

First, when they sought to know the states of the individual realities of existing things, they made the realities into species and genera and investigated the essential accidents of them that lay within their grasp. Thus they obtained many questions unified by their being investigations of the states of that subject, even though their predicates differed. In this respect, they made them one science, separately compiled and named. They allowed anyone to add to it whatever states of that subject he discovered. For what is considered in a science is investigation of all the essential accidents of the subject that human capacity encompasses. A single science can have no meaning except that it is posited for one thing, or for proportionate things, and all its accidents are investigated. Nor can the differentiation of sciences have any meaning except that one investigates the states of one thing and another the states of another thing, different from it in essence or by consideration: the thing may be taken unqualifiedly in one science and qualified in another, or qualified by a different qualification in each. Those states are unknown and sought, while the subject is a known, determinate existent and is fit to be the ground of differentiation.

Second, no science exists whose subject does not contain diverse essential accidents; thus anyone could make it into multiple sciences in this respect. For example, one could make investigation of the act of the legally responsible person in respect of obligation one science, and in respect of prohibition another, and so on. Jurisprudence would then be multiple sciences whose subject is the act of the legally responsible person, and unity and difference would not be determinate.

Benefit. Sadr al-Sharee'a said: a qualification may be mentioned in the subject, and it has two meanings.

The first is that the thing together with that qualification is the subject, as when it is said, “the existent insofar as it is existent,” that is, from this

[Edition footnote 1] He is 'Ubayd Allaah ibn Mas'ood ibn Mahmood ibn Ahmad al-Mahboobee al-Bukhaaree, a Hanafee scholar of philosophy, natural science, legal theory, and religion. He wrote many works in these fields and died in 747 AH / 1346 CE.

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respect. In this respect it is the subject of metaphysics, and the states that attach to it insofar as it is existent, such as unity, multiplicity, and the like, are investigated therein. That qualification—namely, the qualification of existence—is not itself investigated therein, because the subject is that whose essential accidents are investigated, not that which and whose parts are investigated.

The second is that the qualification explains the essential accidents under investigation. A thing may have diverse essential accidents, while only one kind of them is investigated in a science; the qualification explains that kind, and it may therefore be investigated. Thus, when they say, “The subject of medicine is the human body insofar as it is healthy and sick,” and “The subject of astronomy is the bodies of the world insofar as they have figure,” they mean the second sense, not the first. For health and sickness are investigated in medicine, and figure in astronomy; if the first sense were intended, they would not be investigated. It was said: one may reply that we do not concede that, in the first sense, the qualification is a part of the subject; rather, it is a condition of its being a subject, meaning that investigation concerns the accidents that attach to it from that respect. On this consideration, if in the second division also we made it a condition of the subject rather than an explanation of the essential accidents, as the apparent sense of the scholars' words suggests, investigation of it in the science would not be investigation of parts of the subject. Nor would the consequence attributed to Sadr al-Sharee'a—may God have mercy on him—follow for the scholars, namely that two sciences share one subject in essence and consideration. As for the objection that the qualification cannot be among the accidents investigated in the science, since it is not something that attaches to the subject from its own direction—otherwise a thing would precede itself—for example, health and sickness do not attach to the human body insofar as it is healthy and sick: the well-known answer is that what is meant is insofar as health and sickness are possible, and this is not among the accidents investigated. The precise account is that, because subject means that which is investigated in a science with respect to its essential accidents, it is qualified by the qualification in the sense that investigation of the accidents occurs with regard to and in view of that qualification. That is, this universal meaning is observed in all the investigations, not in the sense that all the accidents investigated attach to the subject through this qualification. A detailed treatment of these discussions is to be sought in al-Tawdheeh and al-Talweeh. [Edition footnote 1]

As for the questions, they are the propositions whose demonstration is sought in the sciences. They are mostly theoretical, though they may be necessary; in that case they are included in the science either because they require an admonition that removes their obscurity, or in order to explain their why. For a proposition may be self-evident while its why is not, as with fire's being burning: its facticity—that is, its existence—is known, while its why is unknown. So it is in Sharh al-Mawaaqif and some marginal commentaries on Tahdheeb al-Mantiq. The verifying scholar al-Taftaazaanee—may God have mercy on him—said: a question can only be theoretical, and this is undisputed by anyone; what has been said about the possibility of its being non-acquired is manifestly unsound.

Questions have subjects and predicates. As for their subjects, one may be the subject of the science, as when we say, “Every quantity either shares with another or is dissimilar to it”; quantity is the subject of astronomy. Or it may be the subject of the science together with an essential accident, as when we say, “Every quantity that is a mean proportional is a side of what the two extremes encompass”; quantity is taken in the question together with its being a mean proportional, which is an essential accident. Or it may be a kind of the subject of the science, as when we say, “Every line is capable of being

[Edition footnote 1] These are two books commenting on Sadr al-Sharee'a's *Tanqeeh al-Usool*: the first, al-Tawdheeh, was written by Sadr al-Sharee'a, the author of the *Tanqeeh*; the second, al-Talweeh, was written by Sa'd al-Taftaazaanee (d. 792 AH), as a marginal commentary on Sadr al-Sharee'a's al-Tawdheeh.

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divided”; the line is a kind of quantity. Or it may be a kind together with an essential accident, as when we say, “Every line standing upon a line has its two adjacent angles right angles or equal to them”; the line is a kind of quantity, but is taken in the question together with its standing upon a line, which is an essential accident. Or it may be an essential accident, as when we say, “Every triangle has angles equal to two right angles”; the triangle is an essential accident of quantity. Or it may be a kind of an essential accident, as when we say, “Every isosceles triangle has its two base angles equal.”

In sum, the subjects of questions are the subjects of the science, their parts, their essential accidents, or their particulars. Their predicates, however, are the essential accidents of the subject of the science; they must be external to their subjects, since it is impossible for a part of a thing to be sought through demonstration, because the parts are evident in their establishment for the thing. So it is stated in Sharh al-Shamsiyya. [Edition footnote 1]

Know that it is the custom of authors to mention, after chapters, the exceptional questions belonging to them. They thereby become questions from different chapters, and are sometimes entitled “Scattered Questions” and sometimes “Various Questions.” So it is in Fath al-Qadeer. [Edition footnote 2] This is found most often in books of jurisprudence. As for the principles, they are that upon which the questions of a science depend—that is, the questions depend upon their kind, namely upon assenting to them, for a question does not depend upon a particular proof. They are either conceptions or assents.

As for conceptions, they are the definitions of the subjects—that is, of that to which the subject of the science applies, not of the concept of the subject—as natural body; the definitions of their parts, as prime matter and form; the definitions of their particulars, as simple body; and the definitions of their essential accidents, as motion in relation to natural body. In short, they are the conception of the terms in a manner that is the basis for judgment.

As for assents, they are premises: either self-evident, and called common notions, as when we say in geometry, “Quantities equal to one thing are equal”; or not self-evident, whether demonstrated there, elsewhere, or in another science, upon which the proofs used in that science depend, whether syllogisms or other forms, such as induction and analogy. Restricting them—as some have imagined—to what is demonstrated therein, what is demonstrated in another science, and the parts of syllogisms is open to examination. Those that are not self-evident are either accepted in it—that is, in that science—on the basis of a favourable presumption, and are called postulates, as when we say in geometry, “We may join any two points by a straight line”; or accepted at the time, that is, at the time of argument, despite reservation and doubt until they are made clear in their proper place, and are called demands, because the questions that depend upon them are introduced by them, as when we say therein, “We may draw a circle with any centre and any radius.” The example was criticized on the ground that, in the learner's accepting both on the basis of favourable presumption, there is no difference between it and the statement, “We may join,” and so forth. An example of a demand adduced was Euclid's statement: “If a line falling on two lines makes the interior angles on the same side less than two right angles, then the two lines, if extended on that side, meet.” Yet this is not improbable, for one and the same premise may be a postulate for one person and a demand for another.

The definitions, postulates, and demands must be set at the beginning of a science. As for the common notions, there is no need to

[Edition footnote 1] *al-Shamsiyya* is a concise treatise on logic by Najm al-Deen 'Umar ibn 'Alee al-Qazweenee, known as al-Kaatibee (d. 693 AH), on which there are many commentaries and marginal commentaries. The commentary intended is perhaps that of Sa'd al-Taftaazaanee.

[Edition footnote 2] This is the book *Fath al-Qadeer li-l-'Aajiz al-Faqeer*, written by Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Waahid al-Suyootee, known as Ibn al-Humaam (d. 861 AH), as a commentary on *al-Hidaaya* in the branches of Hanafee jurisprudence by al-Margheenaanee (d. 593 AH).

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begin the science with them because of their obviousness. Common notions may, however, be made specific to the discipline when they are general, and be introduced among the premises, as Euclid did in his book.

Know that this introduction may concern the science itself, by placing before it all that it requires, or a part of it that requires something; but the first is preferable.

Moreover, they sometimes use “principles” in the broader sense: that with which one begins before entering into the aims of a science, as is mentioned at the beginnings of books before entering upon the science, because of its general connection with it. This may be external to the science, being among the preliminaries—namely, things external to which beginning the science depends, even if only in the manner of insight, or of complete insight and abundant desire to acquire it, so that doing so is not conventionally futile; or, in the author's view, such as knowledge of the descriptive definition of the science, which yields greater insight, and knowledge of its end. Or it may not be external to it, but internal to it, in which case it is among principles, which are broader than preliminaries as well; for preliminaries are necessarily external to the science, unlike principles. Principles in this sense may also be counted among the parts of the science, by predominance. If you desire a detailed treatment of this, consult Sharh Mukhtasar al-Usool and its marginal commentaries. [Edition footnote 1]

Some have interpreted “preliminary” as that which assists in acquiring the discipline, so that preliminaries are broader. It has been said that this means preliminaries in this sense are broader than principles in the first sense, not than principles in the second sense, even though the apparent wording might suggest the latter; for between preliminaries and principles in the second sense there is equality, since whatever assists in acquiring a discipline is truly among that upon which the discipline depends, whether absolutely, in the manner of insight, or in the manner of complete insight. In sum, what is considered in principles is dependence in an unrestricted sense. al-Sayyid al-Sanad said: “The principles of a science are what the essence of its intended object depends upon—that is, the conceptions upon which establishing its questions is built—and they may be counted as part of it. But when principles are applied to what the intended object depends upon essentially, conceptually, or in beginning, they are not all among its parts; for conceiving the thing and knowing its end are external to it, and are not among the particulars that it truly includes, because their inclusion in the science is certainly established.” End.

[Edition footnote 1] *Mukhtasar al-Usool* is a book in which its author Jamaal al-Deen Aboo 'Amr 'Uthmaan ibn 'Umar, known as Ibn al-Haajib (d. 646 AH), abridged his book entitled *Muntahaa al-Sool wa-l-Amal fee 'Ilmay al-Usool wa-l-Jadal*. This *Mukhtasar* is the widely circulated and well-known work, and it has many commentaries.

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