الفصل السابع: في بيان الرؤوس الثمانيةBab 01 Fasl 07 — The Eight Introductory Gates

Chapter Seven: On Explaining the Eight Introductory Gates

They say: Whoever undertakes to expound a book must, at its beginning and before embarking upon its subject, address certain matters which the ancient philosophers called “the eight introductory gates.”

The first is the purpose of compiling or acquiring the science—that is, the benefit resulting from it—so that, in the learner's view, acquiring it will not be futile.

The second is the benefit: that which all people naturally desire, namely, the benefit that is properly reckoned as such, so that one may bear the hardship of acquiring it and not

* * *

[Printed page 58]

become listless in pursuing it, causing the effort to be futile according to common usage. Thus it is stated in the Completion of the Jalaalee Gloss. In the Commentary on the Tahdheeb and the Commentary on the Illumination of Wisdom: What is intended by “purpose” is the final cause. For whatever results from an act is called a benefit, advantage, or end; if it motivates the agent to perform that act, it is called a purpose and a final cause. Mentioning a benefit is required only if this science has some benefit and interest in addition to the motivating purpose; otherwise it is not required. In sum, the benefit may itself be the motivating purpose.

The third is the designation, namely, the title of the book, so that the observer may have a general idea of what the purpose will set out in detail. Thus it is stated in the Commentary on the Illumination of Wisdom. In the Completion of the Jalaalee Gloss: The designation is the title of the science. What is apparently intended is to define the science by its description or to state one of its distinctive properties, so that the student may acquire general knowledge of its problems and insight into pursuing it. In the Commentary on the Tahdheeb: The designation is the sign. What is apparently intended is to indicate the reason for the science's name; mentioning the reason for its name gives a general indication of the purposes that the science will explain in detail.

The fourth is the author, namely, the compiler of the book, so that the learner's heart may be at ease with him when accepting his words and relying upon him, since this differs according to the compilers. As for the investigators, they recognize persons by the truth, not the truth by persons. How excellent is the saying: “Do not look at who said it; look at what he said.” It is incumbent upon compilers to avoid adding beyond what is necessary, falling short of what is necessary, using unfamiliar equivocal expressions, and poor arrangement—namely, putting first what ought to be delayed and delaying what ought to be put first.

The fifth is: Of what science is it? That is, whether it belongs to the certainties or the probabilities, the theoretical or the practical sciences, the religious sciences or others, so that the learner may seek the matters suited to the questions being pursued.

The sixth is: What rank does it hold? This means explaining its rank among the sciences, whether in terms of the generality or specificity of its subject, whether it depends upon another science or not, or in terms of its importance or nobility, so that its acquisition may be given precedence over what ought or is preferably given precedence over it, and delayed after what ought or is preferably delayed after it.

The seventh is division, namely, explaining the parts and chapters of the science, so that the learner may seek in each chapter what pertains to it and not waste time acquiring questions unrelated to it. For example, one may say: “The chapters of logic are nine, as follows.” This is the division of the science. There is also the division of the book, as when one says: “This book of ours is arranged into an introduction, two chapters, and a conclusion.” This second kind is widespread and common; no book is generally free of it.

The eighth is the instructional methods: commendable methods in the ways of teaching.

The first of these is division, which means multiplying from above downward—that is, moving from what is more general to what is more specific—such as dividing a genus into species, a species into subdivisions, and a subdivision into individuals. The second is analysis, which is its opposite: multiplying from below upward, that is, moving from what is more specific to what is more general, such as analyzing Zayd into human being and animal, and analyzing human being into animal and body. Thus it is stated in the Completion of the Jalaalee Gloss and the Commentary on the Illumination of Wisdom. In the Commentary on the Tahdheeb, what is intended by division is what is called the construction of a syllogism. This is explained as follows: If you wish to establish one of the matters requiring affirmation, set out the two terms of the desired conclusion and seek all the subjects of each of them and all the predicates of each of them, whether the two terms are predicated of them or they are predicated of the two terms, with or without an intermediary. Likewise, seek everything from which both terms are negated and everything that is negated of both terms. Then examine the relation of the two terms to the subjects and predicates. If, among the predicates of the subject of the desired conclusion, you find something that is the subject of the predicate, the conclusion has been obtained from the first figure; if you find something predicated of its predicate, it is from the second figure; if, among the subjects of its subject, you find something that is the subject of its predicate, it is from the third figure; and if you find something that is the predicate of its predicate, it is from the fourth. All this depends on the various ways in which the conditions are considered with respect to quality, quantity, and modality. Thus it is stated in the Commentary on the Mataali'.

* * *

[Printed page 59]

The meaning of their saying “multiplying from above” is therefore that it proceeds from the conclusion, since the conclusion is the ultimate object in relation to the proof. As for analysis, it is stated in the Commentary on the Mataali' that sciences often present syllogisms yielding conclusions without following logical forms, relying on the intelligent person who knows the rules. If you wish to determine which figure it follows, you must analyze it, which is the opposite of construction, and thereby obtain the desired conclusion. Examine the syllogism that yields it. If it contains a premise that shares both of the conclusion's terms, the syllogism is hypothetical; if it shares one of the conclusion's terms, the syllogism is categorical. Then examine the two terms of the desired conclusion, and the minor premise will be distinguished from the major premise: if that term is subject to judgment in the conclusion, it is the minor premise; if it is the predicate of the judgment, it is the major premise. Then join the other term of the desired conclusion to the other term of that premise. If the two combine in one of the four combinations, what has been joined to the two terms of the conclusion is the middle term, and the premises and figures will become clear to you. If they do not combine, the syllogism is composite. Apply to each one the procedure just described: set out the other term of the desired conclusion and the other term of the premise, just as you first set out the two terms of the desired conclusion in division. Each of them must have some relation to something in the syllogism; otherwise the syllogism would not yield the desired conclusion. If you find a term common to both, the syllogism is complete. If not, proceed in the same manner repeatedly until you reach the syllogism that yields the desired conclusion in itself, and the premises, figure, and conclusion become clear to you. Thus their saying “multiplying from below upward” means proceeding upward to the conclusion. End quote.

The third is definition, that is, the act of defining: presenting the definition of a thing, which indicates the thing in detail by means of that which constitutes it, unlike description, which indicates it in general terms. Thus it is stated in the Commentary on the Illumination of Wisdom. In the Commentary on the Tahdheeb, what is intended by an explanatory definition is definition in general. This is explained as follows: If you wish to define something, you must set out that thing, seek everything more general than it, and predicate it of the thing, with or without an intermediary. You must distinguish essential properties from accidental ones by listing what is necessarily true, or what entails the disappearance of the essence itself merely by being removed, as essential, and whatever is not so as accidental. You must seek everything equal to it, so that genus may be distinguished from general accident and differentia from specific property. Then combine whichever part of the parts of the definiens you wish, after observing the conditions mentioned in the chapter on definition.

The fourth is demonstration, namely, the path to attaining the truth—that is, certainty—when the desired object is theoretical, and to attaining it and acting upon it when it is practical. One may put it this way: If you wish to reach certainty, then, after observing the conditions for the validity of the form, you must use in the proof either the six self-evident premises or what can be obtained from them in a valid form and a productive structure. You must investigate this exhaustively, so that the self-evident propositions are not confused with the commonly accepted, the conceded, the conjectural, and the other types, each with another. Counting the instructional methods among the objectives is closer to the point, and they should therefore be mentioned among the objectives. For this reason, you see later scholars, such as the author of the Mataali', treating everything besides definition under the discussions of proof, even though he appended syllogism to it. As for definition, its proper place is among the discussions of the definiens. Thus it is stated in the Commentary on the Tahdheeb.

* * *

[Printed page 60]

Know that they limited themselves to these eight because they found nothing else that assists in acquiring the discipline. Whoever finds another matter may add it to them. This is a matter of recommendation; omitting it does not entail corruption, as is evident. Thus it is stated in the Completion of the Jalaalee Gloss.

Know also that they may mention the reason why the science is needed; there is no doubt that here this is precisely the explanation of its purpose. They may also mention the reason for the science's nobility and say: The nobility of a craft is either due to the nobility of its subject, as with goldsmithing, which is nobler than tanning, since the subject of goldsmithing is gold and silver, and these are nobler than the subject of tanning, which is leather; or due to the nobility of its purpose, as with the craft of medicine, which is nobler than the craft of cleaning latrines, since the purpose of medicine is to confer health, whereas the purpose of cleaning latrines is to clean the lavatory; or due to the intensity of the need for it, as with jurisprudence, since the need for it is greater than the need for medicine. There is no event in the universe that does not require jurisprudence, for through it the sound order of this world and of religion is maintained, whereas medicine is needed by some people at some times. What is intended by this is to explain the science's rank, as can be understood from what preceded it. This is supported by what al-Sayyid al-Sanad said in the Commentary on the Maqaasid: “As for the rank of theology—that is, its nobility—you know that its subject is the most general and highest of matters …” and so on.

* * *

[Printed page 61]