خاتمة القسم الأول في بيان تطبيق الآراءConclusion — Application and Reconciliation of Views

Conclusion to the First Section: On Explaining the Application of Opinions

Chapter: On the Nature and Possibility of Application

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Conclusion to the First Section: On Explaining the Application 1 of Opinions

I say: The recording of the various schools together with their proofs and objections has produced an incurable disease of perplexity and doubt regarding the past, and has removed security regarding the present. The common people are caught between one who is fanatically devoted to taqleed and cannot distinguish what is near from what is remote, and one who wavers, bewildered, concerning the sound truth. With the help of God—Glorious and Exalted—I therefore recorded in al-Durar wa-l-Durar the general principles of the scales of verification, the causes of disagreement, and the rules governing application. I wished to present them here, hoping that God—Glorious is He—might benefit His servants through them, in chapters.

Chapter: On the Nature and Possibility of Application

Point: By application is not meant denying one of two disputants' claim that he contradicts the other, nor interpreting one of their statements as intending the other's meaning, nor claiming that the foundations and branches of every school correspond to reality. Rather, it means knowing the extent to which each school conforms to reality and the extent to which it departs from it, and knowing the cause of that departure, so that one may discern it from its statements, foundations, and branches, until the heart is reassured and doubt disappears.

Point: The perceptions2 and beliefs arising in souls are originated entities; they therefore necessarily have active and receptive causes, conditions, and preparatory factors. All of these are realities or terminate in realities. A reality cannot entail sheer falsehood, or anything that entails it. In general, their condition resembles that of all evils occurring in the world: their evil lies in one aspect and not another, and their origin is partial privations necessary for a class of existing things. Likewise, the falsity of some beliefs lies in one aspect and not another, and originates in privations attached to some existing forms—for example, obtaining one thing under the heading of another after seeking it; representing one thing in the form of another; applying a rule while heedless of an impediment; making an analogical inference despite a relevant difference; taking knowledge from one who is not its proper possessor out of a favorable opinion of him; interpreting speech in a sense other than its proper one because a preference has taken root in the heart; and similar cases. When one examines

1 In the margin opposite this heading: “This, and the preceding subject, are taken from al-Takmeel by the eminent shaykh Rafee' al-Deen, son of the traditionist shaykh Ahmad Walee Allaah al-Dihlawee—may God have mercy on them both.” “From him—may his exalted shadow endure.”

2 Written above it between the lines: “That is, from the speech of the author of the school. From him.”

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their principles, which necessitate them, both unseen1 and visible, celestial and terrestrial, compelled and voluntary, internal to the perceiver and external to it, the position of every statement and its connection with reality, both in quality and degree, becomes apparent. Thus all the schools agree. One should not doubt this summary, even though the detailed removal of disagreement is among the special mercies of God—and God singles out whomever He wills for His mercy.

Point: Whoever makes a judgment concerning something judges it only according to the image of it formed in his mind. In reality, the object of his indication is the possessor of that image. The distinction between the possessor of the image, its source, and what is intended by it is clear; and the image never contradicts its possessor. From this perspective there is no falsehood at all: everyone reports the truth present before him and disclosed to him. Yet one must not stop at this point; one must distinguish truth from falsehood, so that guidance and error may become manifest.

Point: There is no doubt that things are not equally related to one another, and that our encompassing all things—or even one thing from every aspect—is impossible. When a person seeks to obtain something, he may conceive it otherwise than it is; and when he recognizes it, he may seek it through principles other than its principles or take it from a source other than its source—either through customary conversations that have filled his ears or ordinary descriptions in which his heart has found repose. He arrives at something that appears evident to him according to his course and method, believes it to be the object sought, and clings to it, thereby going astray. Let him recall here the forms of error previously discussed in logic, as support for this point.

Point: When his seeking is sound, he reaches the real matter in the manner that actually suits his method, within one of the systems, one of the loci, and one of the levels of reality. He submits to it and rejects the one who follows a method other than his, although that person has reached another aspect of the same system, or another system in that locus, or another locus at that level, or another level among the levels of reality. Thus a wide field of dispute opens between them. The truth is that, when insight is penetrating, there is no mutual contradiction among systems, loci, and levels at all.

Point: This existing multiplicity is ordered by different aspects of essential and accidental unity, differing in generality and particularity. The arrangement of its individuals, whether sensory or rational, we call a “system.” Systems that agree in what is perceived constitute one “locus”; the loci through which the existences of things multiply, with none falling under another in a given respect, have between them the relation of the unseen to the visible. We call these “levels of reality.” Thus the carpenter considers a tree in terms of how many trunks, boards, and other wooden implements can be obtained from it, and for what purposes its wood is suitable; the traveler considers it in terms of the shade it provides; the farmer in terms of how much water it needs and why it is green or yellow; the pharmacist in terms of its components—fiber, wood, leaves, flowers, fruit, and kernel; the physician in terms of its effects on the human body; and the natural philosopher in terms of its powers—attracting, retaining, digesting, and expelling—and in terms of its anatomy. These are its aspects. One may also consider it in terms of its species and seed; in terms of its being in its grove, what is there and what will be there afterward; or in terms of its ownership, its owner, the kind of property by which he owns it, and what he obtains from it. These are systems embracing it, while its smells, tastes, colors, and tactile qualities are loci. If a person with an intention overlooks other attributes and denies them, dispute is constituted.

1 In the margin opposite it: “That is, insofar as those principles are unseen.”

2 Written above it between the lines: “That is, the investigator of natural philosophy.”

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Point: Application does not declare both parties ignorant except insofar as each falls short of fully directing the words of his opponent. It is known that the causes leading to hostility do not leave the heart free for this matter. The seeker of truth must expend his utmost effort in grasping reality, not in serving people's words. Moreover, who can guarantee anyone freedom from deficiency in knowledge? God Most High has said: “You have not been given of knowledge except a little” [Qur'aan 17:85]. Our predecessor in applying the verses was the exegete of the community, 'Abd Allaah b. 'Abbaas—may God have mercy on him; in applying the reports, the author of al-Mugheeth min Mukhtalif al-Hadeeth; in the opinions of Muslims, Shaykh 'Alaa' al-Dawla al-Simnaanee; in the Sharee'a and philosophy, the Brethren of Purity; in reconciling the opinion of the two sages, Aboo Nasr al-Faaraabee; and in Islam and Indian thought, Daaraa Shikooh. The Proof of Islam prepared the way for interpreting the doctrines of the innovators through the five existents in Faysal al-Tafriqa bayna Ahl al-Bida' wa-l-Zandaqa. Shaykh Ibn 'Arabee said:

Creatures have formed beliefs concerning the Godhead ... and I have believed in all that they have formed.

The two eminent gnostics, Shaykh Ahmad al-Sirhindee and Shaykh Walee Allaah al-Dihlawee—may God sanctify their secrets—also sought to apply the doctrines of the witnessing-oriented and existence-oriented schools to one another, although they did not establish rules for it. We have made clear to you the excellence of its benefit. That is a favor from God upon us and upon people, but most people do not give thanks.

1 He is Shaykh Mahmood b. Taahir; al-Baghdaadee, author of al-Eedhaah, did not mention the date of his death, and he may have lived later.

2 He is 'Alaa' al-Dawla Rukn al-Deen Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Simnaanee, author of many works on Qur'aanic exegesis, hadeeth, and theology. He died in 736 AH = 1336 CE.

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Point: Reason is the foundation of the means of acquisition. Transmitted report, unveiling, and sensory perception cannot dispense with it; it judges them, operates through them, and distinguishes among their kinds and levels. Its judgment is universal with respect to perception and acceptance, even though it may fall short of some of them with respect to acquisition and attainment. When they say, “A mode beyond the mode of reason,” they mean the rules laid down by those called “the partisans of reason,” or reason in isolation, without addition or assistance from anything else. Its proponents differ among themselves in intuition and experience. Some have a greater presence of first principles, a more distant transition to consequences, and deeper penetration into the relations of transition; their experiences are more numerous, their activity more sustained, their senses finer, their awareness of common matters—causes, judgments, and differences of source—sharper, their vision more connected to reality, and their departure from what is customary easier. Others are below them in this.

When transmitted report is established from the prophets—peace be upon them—it is stronger. Its proponents differ among themselves in transmission and understanding.

Some have a sounder chain, encountered more teachers, taught more skillfully, reported more truthfully, introduced fewer innovations, transmitted fuller texts, used clearer wording, heard more precisely, retained more completely, had more teachers, traveled farther, and understood more deeply. Among them, the grounds for preferring chains and the causes of impugnment differ. Others are below them in this.

As for unveiling, when complete it is the broadest of these. Its proponents differ greatly in their disclosure of the worlds present before them and in their richness in the hidden inscriptions within them.

Some are shown the subtle realities of corporeal beings—such as the lower angels, devils, and jinn—or ideal realities in their various levels, at times for guidance and at times for misguidance; or spiritual realities in their degrees, whether human, celestial, or supernal. The Divine names and attributes may be disclosed to them, or the Essence may be disclosed once in perceptual mirrors, through its affecting their faculties, or in ideal forms, through its taking their form, and at another time through a direct unveiling.

Others become annihilated in the essence of desires and ingrained habits within them, or in the subtle realities concealed in their essence. Some realities then appear in one manner in one subtle faculty and in another manner in another. Or they become annihilated in their various existences, established by them in previous descents or forthcoming ascents; or in the realities flowing through them, some created, such as the realities of elemental or celestial corporeal forms, the prime matter of absolute body, or the 'amaa'1; and some belonging to the category of partial and universal names according to their stations, and essential modes in their various kinds. In all this, they are granted the knowledge and states of those stations, and their implications take form before them.

Point: What counts among rational matters is what reaches certainties by balanced methods, whether closely or evidently. Among transmitted matters, it is what the hadeeth masters have authenticated or deemed sound, and what generations known for goodness have inherited in meaning, supported by transmitted evidence, without diverting it from the conventional apparent sense of its like—whether literal or figurative, explicit or allusive. Among unveiled matters, it is what proceeds from one who has undergone complete annihilation, or after complete emptying and continual, sustained turning toward God—Glorious and Exalted—whose form is preserved exactly, and which produces a state

1 In the margin opposite it: “The 'amaa' is possibility, from which the world of spirits and bodies was created together; it is the first created thing, as reported in the hadeeth: Aboo Razeen asked the Messenger of God, God bless him and grant him peace, 'Where was our Lord before He created His creation?' He said: 'He was in a 'amaa', above which was air and beneath which was air.' From him—may he be shown mercy.”

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of divine or angelic states, and whose possessor's station and conduct are known.

Point: In logic, they have detailed the conditions of intuition, experience, primary principles, and immediate observations; in the principles of jurisprudence and hadeeth, the conditions of soundness and the grounds of impugnment and preference; and in Maa laa yu'awwal 'alayhi, by Shaykh Ibn 'Arabee, the conditions of unveiling. Let the seeker of detail consult these works. We have sufficed with a summary, seeking brevity.

Point: The Peripatetics devote themselves to action; the early traditionists among the transmitters; and the later Sufis to unveiling. The theologians combine transmitted report and reason; the Illuminationists combine reason and unveiling; and those who combine both with moderation are rare.

Point: Some sciences are sensory; some are rational and ordered so as to correspond to the sensory; some are purely rational, have no counterpart in sensation, yet can be established decisively by reason; some are inductive, in which certainty is impossible and whose utmost result is conjecture or supposition; and some cannot be reached by reason but only through hearing, whether from sensation, revelation, or unveiling. Of these, some can be established decisively and some cannot. All differ in clarity and obscurity; in suitability or aversion for particular souls; in presence and benefit for the felicities of souls; in sources and methods; in their need for practical exercise or freedom from it; in the intensity or absence of desire for them; in whether they change with the passage of time or remain stable; in whether one precedes or follows another; in whether it is an object or a means; in the perfection of different faculties; and in their role in satisfying incidental or original needs. Their distinction by subjects and the ends arising from them in this world and the next is known. Their explanation and the degrees of those who know them consequently differ.

Point: Those who investigate realities are of degrees.

Class: They are the people who extract questions, establish sciences, and criticize them. Their vision of reality is unrestricted. Some of their opinions rely on sound foundations, but in deriving branches from them they combine truth and falsehood. Others rely on corrupt foundations that they establish to preserve their school in branches whose truth is known, since they cannot derive them from other foundations; or they accept the necessity of branches whose falsity is acknowledged because their opposites are unacceptable to them, out of familiarity, conformity to temperament, pursuit of an objective, or discovery of a proof they cannot repel. The verifier concerns himself with their speech.

Class:

They are those who explain the speech of the former, derive branches from their rules, and defend them. Their vision of reality is restricted, and their error is multiplied. Nevertheless, their speech contains benefits worth harvesting.

Class: They set some statements against others by question, answer, and interpretation, according to the extent of their acquaintance with books. Their speech is less useful. The person skilled in the speech and habits of the imams escapes the turmoil of their disputation, although in their bewilderment they may sometimes pass near the truth, and the lost wisdom may fall from their mouths.

Class: Their highest ambition is to direct expressions, conduct verbal debates, and prefer possibilities by every near or remote route. They do not raise their heads toward reality at all. Their foundation collapses through a mere qualification, observation of a restriction, or presentation of a possibility. The verifier has no concern with them whatsoever. This occurs in most disciplines, so distinguish them.

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Chapter: On the Causes of Disagreement

Observation: Just as death is a natural necessity of human life, in view of particular and universal nature together—the particular requiring it through its dependence upon heat and moisture, and the universal requiring it so that eternal providence may fulfill the demands of the universal natures of the elements, the celestial spheres, and the simple bodies, which entail the dissolution of compounds, while the celestial configurations culminate in the severing factors—so, too, disagreement is natural to human intellects, in view of particular and universal nature together. To this is指 indicated His saying, exalted is He: {And they will continue to differ, except those upon whom your Lord has mercy; and for that He created them}.

As for the particular aspect, it is due to the existence among them of a governing faculty, and to the fact that what encompasses the apprehension of one of them differs from what encompasses the apprehension of another, for reasons that we shall explain. As for the universal aspect, it is because when the Maker of the world—glorious is His majesty—desired to order the two modes of existence and cultivate the two abodes by bringing forth in them the effects of beauty and majesty, and, in accordance with that providence, made endeavors and ranks dependent upon beliefs, their divergence became necessary. Concordance, therefore, is according to knowledge and understanding, not through removing disputes from among people.

Observation: The causes of divergent beliefs are general causes that encompass them and other matters as well.

Among them is the divergence of the celestial configurations according to the cycles, the general and particular conjunctions, the ascendants of nativities, and the inclinations. It has been tried among the Indians that whoever has the Sun and Jupiter in his seventh [house] has the reality of Islam disclosed to him and leaves his religion for it. It is mentioned that the occurrence of the planets upon the ascendant in the tenth [house] illuminates the intellect, and that the connection of the Part of the Unseen with the benefics makes opinions sound in their proper domains.

Among them is the divergence of terrestrial natures—of regions and countries, their plains and rugged lands, their deserts and settled areas—as well as of temperamental qualities and the customs of peoples. Among the Indians, long periods fall within their apprehensions, whereas with the Arabs it is the opposite.

Among them is the divergence of predispositions according to the individual and specific forms that overflow upon receptive matter in accordance with eternal providence.

Among them is the divergence of the colors of the precinct of holiness, according to the providences of the Higher Assembly, and the ascent of the ideal forms from among the children of Adam who are prepared for the manifestation of a renewed effusion from there.

Among them is the succession of the dominion of the Divine Names governing the ages, which entails the gradual manifestation of the varieties of perfections and crafts. The exposition of these principles is mentioned in their respective sciences; the purpose here is to draw attention to them and recall them.

Observation: The formation of religions and schools of thought has contributing factors that are among the causes of disagreement:

Among them is the direction of divine providence through sending messengers as bearers of glad tidings and warners. When the welfare of people was confined to this, [the messengers] explained it in distant regions or ages through diverse laws. God Most High said: {People were one community, so God sent the prophets as bearers of glad tidings and warners}—the verse.

Among them are the experiences of the intelligent, the observations of the sages, what has been transmitted from the saints, what is regarded as blessed from the practice of the righteous, and the policies of kings and princes in every community, each according to what their intellects had attained concerning the ordering of their interests in accordance with their natures and customs.

1 In the margin: “Grammatically connected with what follows, namely, 'explaining.' From him.”

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Among them is the spread of lying claimants to prophethood, misleading impostors, falsifiers among the purloiners, and inventors among the practitioners of fortune and power. Connected with this are the motives for people's acceptance: innate affinities; belief in voices and dreams; association with miracles or gradual enticements; the orderly functioning of the interests of a state and prestige; anticipation of motives of greed and the like, or anger and zeal; fear of the sword and humiliation; incomplete experience of worldly recompense; the clarity of an argument; the embellishment of a sophism; agreement with the majority; the employment of magic; or the lack of reflection on the part of the first class ... and other such things. This continues perpetually, through God's—glorified is He—support, by sending renewers and champions of it, and by setting up manifest signs of its truth in the form of supernatural events and earlier and later testimonies; by the misfortunes and ill omen that befall those who abandon it; or by fear of the thrusts of spears and tongues in disobeying the established order; by familiarity with the practice of the forefathers and imitation of those possessed of deficient intellects; by love of leadership and prestige in a religion or school of thought; by envy of the scholars or hostility toward them; by the rational person's refraining from apprehending the truth and removing disagreement because of deficient understanding; and by the like of these contributing factors. The emergence of successors upon the dispositions of their predecessors stirs their desire for their beliefs and for defending them. This then branches out into the divergence of the temperaments of the religious and adherents of schools, so that disagreement extends as God Most High wills.

Observation: People are created with diverse instincts, aspirations, and habits. Various associations, purposes, and coincidences then become available to them, and their divergence has a powerful role in producing opinions and preferring among alternatives. Among them is the keen-minded person, able to extract the essential points from the admixture of customary things and expressions, whereas the dull person is incapable of this; the person confined to the sensible, who sees the intelligible only from afar, and the person detached from the sensible; the one excessive in measuring the unseen by the witnessed, and the one who goes too far in fleeing from that analogy; the hasty person in acceptance and denial, without acquiring comprehensive experience, and the deliberate person; the lenient person, who is satisfied with probability and with one of the possible forms that suffices for the outward purpose, and the one who investigates it; the alert person, attentive to correspondences, distinctions, and concomitants, and the one heedless of them; the person overcome by imagination, who bases the matter on purely conceptual considerations, and the one dominated by it; the person who examines a thing by exerting effort and directing intention, and the one who passes over it casually and parasitically; the lucid intellect, which becomes aware of things without instruction and at the slightest indication, and the obscure intellect, incapable of that; the person bound by the revealed laws, and the one lax in them; the person accustomed to established practice, and the one indifferent to it; the broad-minded person, who encompasses the divisions and qualifications, the antecedent and subsequent matters, and the expanded discussions, and the narrow-minded one; the person who desires distinctiveness, and the one who recoils from it and loves imitation; the person perceptive of a thing's branches and consequences, and the one stagnant with regard to it; the person who loves an individual or a school of thought, and the one who hates it. In extracting and inserting into it, they undertake every difficult and easy course; they include the investigator and the imitator, the impartial person and the bigot, the conformist, the person capable of expressing what is in his conscience and the one incapable of it, the person of sound understanding and the one of crooked understanding, and the person of pure inwardness, to whom falsehood brings restlessness like the eating of flies, and the person whose tranquility amid falsehoods is clouded. There is also the one who refines the intended meaning by removing means and extraneous attachments, and the one who blunders through it; the person who, after examining a matter, has the judgment settle in his heart, and the bewildered person who forms no judgment; and other such kinds, whose classes and individuals are not difficult for an alert person to recognize through investigation.

1 In the margin of the original: “Among them is the one who appeared in this age, called Sayyid Ahmad, by way of inversion of the proposition. The learned Sayyid, compiler of this book, mentioned him in Hujaj al-Karaamah and al-Idhaa'ah. Let whoever wishes consult those works; the reality of the matter will thereby become clear to him.” “Mawlawi al-Sahsawani, may he remain safe.”

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These and similar things are like glasses placed before the faculties of insight: they veil them from attaining reality as it is, without admixture, or they assist them in attaining it. A seeker of truth ought not to neglect them or become confined within what is defective among them, provided that he avoids excess and deficiency and gives every possessor of a right his due.

Point: Among the causes of disagreement is the difference in the states of a thing in itself. The discussion of the difference of aspects, systems, and abodes has already been given in outline; here it is clarified by examples. A thing may be a complete cause of one thing and an incomplete cause of another; independent of one thing and not independent of another; proximate to one thing and not to another; sufficient for one thing and not for another. Or it may have causes of these kinds. A thing may be necessarily conjoined with something under one supposition, impossible to conjoin with it under another supposition, and possibly conjoined with it—more probably or otherwise—under yet another supposition. There may be between two things a relation of otherness in one respect and identity in another, or in other respects. A thing may be simple in composition and composite in analysis, or the reverse; it may have a part in reality but not to the senses; it may be included in both conventionally while being outside both in reality; it may be simple in the external world but not in the mind, or the reverse. A thing may be one in one respect and many in another; finite in actuality and infinite in potentiality; necessary absolutely, or necessary with respect to a condition; voluntary with a determinate condition or without a condition; existent in time, or existent universally or accidentally; nonexistent at the present moment, or nonexistent through individuation or in essence; continuous as a species while renewed as an individual; self-evident under one description and theoretical under another; subject to contraries among its individuals or within the limits of its extensions; uniform in its ruling with respect to nature or within one of its limits; fixed upon one attribute at one time and absent, or fixed upon another attribute, at another time.

These are examples of the aspects. Likewise, systems differ as true and false, harmful and beneficial, perfect and corrupt, according to two systems—for example, the system of sense and the system of revealed law; the status of the child of fornication and of usury in the Hereafter and in this world; and poison for the one who administers it and for the one who is poisoned.

Among the systems are the system of universal nature and of the particular natures ordered from the various simple and composite bodies; the system of wisdom, which requires causation, and the system of power, which prevents it; the system of choices; the system of recompenses; the system of celestial configurations; the system of human customs ... and so forth. In the same manner, abodes differ: a thing is a substance in one abode and an accident in another, an animal in the imaginal realm and an inanimate thing in the witnessed realm, fortunate in one existence and wretched in another, pre-eternal in one context and originated in another, at one and the same time or at different times; one according to one context, while possessing many concrete instances and forms according to another. There is no doubt that the rulings of one aspect differ from those of the other. Whenever one of two observers attends to one aspect and the other to another, because of a path he has taken or an obscurity that has befallen him, reports differ according to the extent of their comprehension and restriction, and the dispute among the rulings rises to its feet. The discerning person must therefore take heed of these matters and investigate them.

Point: Among the causes for attributing disagreement to the verified authorities is a difference of expressions. A single general form may arise in the mind, yet they differ in naming it according to the languages and customary terminologies familiar to them, and in explaining it according to the meanings important to them, and according to their degree of elaboration or concision, and in conceiving it through expressions varying in proximity and remoteness in proportion to their eloquence. They may express one and the same thing once in the form of its impression upon the apprehensive faculty, or of the apprehensive faculty's apprehension of its likenesses—so that, for example, it is said: “The sun has gone beneath the cloud,” while it is above it—and once by what that faculty has apprehended, without deviation or investigation of the truth, as one expresses a dream before interpreting it; and once after stripping the truth of its coverings and veils; and once with respect to its determination in a

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rank, or its being the effect of an agent, or a form in matter, or a principle of an end, with differences in the agent, matter, and end—so that disagreement concerning it is imagined, though it is not so. A thing may also be considered generally or superficially, through lack of attention to it, or in detail, probing inward layer after inward layer according to degrees of attention. A general statement may be particularized in speech for purposes of representation or emphasis; a particular statement may be generalized for ambiguity, conjecture, or exaggeration; a claim of limitation may be made merely for emphasis; a conventional metaphor used by the speaker may be introduced, or a circumlocution whose intended object is something else, or an allusion. Different examples may be given, bringing one aspect nearer and another farther away, while leaving the common denominator ambiguous, either because the example is more eloquent in the speaker's idiom or for variety in expression. The apparent meaning may be displaced because of the narrowness of the expression, as when temporal order is put in place of rank order, or temporal simultaneity in place of actual concomitance, while the reality is one and the same for all. After that comes the task of investigating usages and technical terms, and clarifying the sharing of two meanings by one word, or the synonymy of two words over the entire meaning, or their differentiation through attention to a qualifier that is a part or a condition. Though this is easy after comprehending the abodes and systems, the truth is that it too can be properly carried out only by a brilliant, exacting, impartial scholar who combines two qualities: extensive immersion and passage through the words of the verified imams, and powerful precision and investigation in the two arts of dialectic and interpretation, with support and guidance from God, the Lord of success.

Point: One of the greatest causes of disagreement is the variety of later readers' understandings of the words of earlier writers. This is what stirred the tumultuous strife among commentators and glossators and led to the fabrication of schools of thought against their adherents. Misunderstanding sometimes arises from complete partisanship for, and hostility toward, one side; and sometimes from inattention to the aim of the speaker and the point at which he directs his gaze.

We rejoiced at the censurer's allusion to your mention ...

For we are in one valley, and the censurer in another.

Sometimes it arises from inability to exhaust the implied qualifications in an abridged work and preserve the implicit restrictions in an expansive one; sometimes from error in the interpretation because of homonymy, metaphorical usage, or the antecedent of a pronoun; sometimes from hastening and then persisting in what has previously settled in the mind, without giving inquiry its due; sometimes from rejecting what has been heard because of a false good opinion of its speaker; and sometimes from dullness before a subtle meaning and infatuation with one's own opinion. A person remains an enemy to what he does not know. These and similar matters are understood by the verified scholar from the speech and its context, just as a physician understands the illness of the sick person from its symptoms and from the regimen already prescribed.

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Chapter: On the Rules Governing Application

Point: One who seeks reconciliation ought to take reality as a spacious region, and allot to the adherent of every school a quarter of it from the quarters of the higher and lower realms, from the horizons of the unseen and the witnessed, and from one aspect of knowledge and one aspect of concrete reality. Indeed, he ought to take every person as a thriving country containing innumerable necessary and separable qualities, outward and inward attributes, essential and extraneous attributes, conjunctive and relational attributes, real and relative attributes, and positive and negative attributes. The field open to investigators is only one plain rather than another; they must restrict the universal assertion or negation of each to its own station and scene, for every station has sciences and cognitions that do not exist in another, as it is said: “For every limit there is a place of appearance.” Its possessor often overlooks what lies beyond it and reports only what he has encompassed. He must not accept one person's negation of another's statement, nor his interpretation of it, except when it comes from the possessor of divine revelation as an unequivocal, decisive text; and he must

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not hasten to deny something strange. He must take great care to verify the subject term by identifying its reality within the region of existence: Where is it? What is it? This is done by surveying the attributes that became the heading of his inquiry and the object of his scrutiny. A single heading may sometimes denote divergent essences to which it applies together, successively, or alternately—and the reverse is also the case.

He must refine the predicate term by distinguishing the unrestricted application of its concept from the particular manner in which it is established for, and realized in, the subject. In every discipline he must rely only upon the words of its constitutional authority and its transmitters, and must not neglect the way its adherents understand his words or criticize his view. He must weigh their principles on the scales of proofs and indications, and examine the materials until the failure or validity, strength or weakness, and particularity to the claims or generality of their proofs become clear. Then he must return to consider the subsidiary issues through the indications distinctive to them, with an initial examination, for lapses and oversights have occurred in the derivations. He must investigate the beginnings of the affairs of those who articulated and championed the schools, and the changes in their circumstances up to the state in which their affairs ended; through this, their aims, their retractions in doctrine and their causes, and their movement from a higher to a lower degree or from a lower to a higher one become known, as do the objects of their striving—attainment of truth, pursuit of felicity, wealth and standing, or corruption of a religion or method. He must take note of their concurrence and their differences in mentioning and omitting, abridging and expanding, and know that some opinions reach as their ultimate purpose merely the clarification of an excuse for their author's ignorance of the central matter.

In sum: if he preserves this and things like it through an innate disposition bestowed upon him or an acquired acumen, success—by God's leave—will be easy for him. God guides whom He wills to a straight path.

Note: actuality is the state in which a thing itself stands in its own context, apart from the perception of perceivers, the expressions of those who express it, and the means of arriving at it, whether by direct observation or demonstration. Thus, some have explained it as that required by necessity and demonstration. Since opinions differ over whether premises are held to be demonstrations or specious arguments, and over whether contexts are taken broadly or narrowly, the referent of “actuality” differs; hence accounts of it differ. Whoever does not notice this difference will not notice correspondence.

Among them are those who maintain that actuality is the context of subsistence beyond existence.

Among them are those who confine it to existence and its concomitants, holding existence to be only fundamental, or fundamental and shadowy, or both of these and relational.

Among them are those who confine the sphere of possibility to what has place and direction.

Among them are those who confine it to visible things and the meanings contained in them.

Among them are those who confine it to individuals, excluding their universals.

Among them are those who confine it to things whose parts are assembled.

Among them are those who confine it to what has prior matter, excluding newly originated existence. One must therefore ascertain their aims from the purport of their subsidiary and foundational doctrines.

Note: establishing the World of Images is a great foundation of reconciliation, since it contains the forms of both immaterial and material realities. Those who investigate traverse what is in it, and report what they find, even if they do not know that it belongs to the World of Images. This is more frequent in transmitted reports and unveilings than in rational matters.

And because it contains spiritual entities called the summoners of Judaism, Christianity, and other religions and schools, and because they

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cast the forms of beliefs into people's faculties of perception, and promote those beliefs through dreams and voices; souls are thereby reassured by them and recoil from their opposites.

And because it contains the repository of falsehoods, as I explained in detail in the Tafseel1 of the Treatise on Love; through contact with it diverse opinions arise, and those opinions persist through the firmly rooted habit it forms.

And because those imaginal forms serve as titles and mirrors for absent and imagined matters, difference is supposed to lie in them. This is frequent in rational matters. In this world there are colors, dimensions, and shapes; it does not crowd material bodies. Imaginal things differ in subtlety, density,2 firmness, and concealment. The common people think of them only as bodies, calling them unseen and visible bodies; thus one addresses and makes them understand on that basis. Rather, the denial of them, the confinement of bodies to visible ones, and the precise regulation of their rulings are among the subtleties of philosophers and theologians.

Note: among the foundations of reconciliation is self-disclosure (tajallee). It is established rationally, by transmission, and by unveiling. It pertains to the plane of multiplicity: neither does one who denies the unity of existence deny it, nor can one who affirms it dispense with it, for distinguishing the rulings of the Real from those of created beings. I have set out its matter and form in the Treatise on Love and elsewhere. It has two kinds: with the affirmation of an intermediary and with its removal.

That which affirms the intermediary has as its matter what is characterized by both effacement and representation, and as its form the will to become known. It is divided into: existential, by which the order of the world is arranged; perfective, which is in itself an external matter; and contemplative, which occurs in the mirrors of perception. Of this last kind are formal, semantic, and tasted forms.

That which removes the intermediary is either such that the veil lies on the side of the one to whom disclosure is made, whether a quality or an adjunct; or between the discloser and the one to whom disclosure is made; or on the side of the discloser. The latter is conceivable only through transition from one affair to another and from one locus to another. The removal of what is in the house is either by annihilating it or by removing its obstruction, through the ascent of the one to whom disclosure is made or the condescension of the discloser. The verifier al-Qoonawee3 extended it to everything not contained by directions, and he was right. The difference between the attachment of the soul to the body, representation by representation, and disclosure by disclosure is the occurrence of confinement and passivity together in the first; of passivity alone in the second; and the absence of both in the third. Self-disclosure necessarily involves an intermingling with the World of Images, because it includes the aspect of representation; for visible things do not naturally bear representation, though they may bear it by convention. Many differences in rational, transmitted, and unveiled matters are resolved thereby.4 Note: a thinker or one who undergoes unveiling may be absorbed in what occurs to him,5 so that everything else is hidden from him; he then speaks universally, though its instance is only particular. Or he may attend to a subtle meaning, and reflection follows it, so that he judges accordingly concerning whatever bears a trace6 of it and the slightest affinity with it, while another does not attend to it.

1 In the margin of the original: “The Treatise on Love has three parts: Tahseel, Tadhyeel, and Tafseel. This is mentioned in the third part. From it.”

2 Above it between the lines: “to the World of Images.”

3 In the margin of the original: “Shaykh Sadr al-Deen al-Qoonawee, disciple of Muhyee al-Deen Ibn 'Arabee.” His name was Muhammad ibn Ishaaq ibn Muhammad ibn Yoosuf ibn 'Alee al-Qoonawee al-Roomee, a Sufi with many writings; he died in 673 AH = 1275 CE.

4 Above it between the lines: “that is, by self-disclosure.”

5 In the margin: “what comes upon the heart.”

6 Above it between the lines: “a passing state.”

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The shadow may be confused with the original, and the restricted with the unrestricted; he then assents to the fundamentality of the shadow and the unrestrictedness of the restricted. He notices this only after rising beyond it, while one who knows the original and the unrestricted exposes his statement. Then, when he has risen beyond it, he may express this by speaking of a return and declaring the former view mistaken; or he may acknowledge having entered into it and having its secret and inner meaning disclosed to him, while retaining the former judgment. Thus difference is thought to remain, though it has vanished. Take heed of this.

Note: correctness and error are applied in practical matters in one respect to the attainment or nonattainment of the end by an art, and in another to proceeding in accordance with a rule. In legal matters they are applied once to arriving at the Lawgiver's intent, and once to judging according to the evidence. Their meaning thus differs with the differing basis: to judge something means that this is what follows from this measure of premises. In this sense, contention in legal matters is removed. Thereafter, abrogation too is among the forms of reconciliation, since each proof is put into effect in its proper time; likewise specification, since proofs are put into effect in their proper locus. Further, among reconciliation in reports whose chain and indication are sound, even in general, is construing them as strict obligation and dispensation, permissibility and disapprobation, strictness and ease, or reprehensibility and prohibition, on the basis of the principle of setting aside denunciation. Most transmitters, who do not delve into the subtleties of rulings, may, when transmitting by meaning, add or omit concerning command and restraint. But mention and omission, or specification and ambiguity, are counted as contradiction only by one who has little experience in meanings; similar to these are transposition and postponement in speech.

Note: Hujjat al-Islaam1 stated in Faysal al-Tafriqa bayna Ahl al-Bida' wa-l-Zandaqa that a thing may have existence in itself, outside sense and intellect—namely, essential existence; existence in sense, as when the sun appears as a loaf, a drop as a line, and an arc from the circumference of a great circle as straight; existence in imagination, either in the form of perception, as the apparition of one asleep or delirious, or in a form for recollection; existence in intellect, by abstracting the essence or its distinctive attribute, even if customarily, from their coverings, as craftsmanship from the hand and preservation from the eye; and analogical existence, which is the metaphorical application of the name of one disparate thing to another because they share a known meaning. Scriptural texts must be construed according to the strongest of the foregoing order, unless something becomes apparent to the investigator that indicates the negation of one of the preceding kinds; then they are construed according to the following kind, while affirming that this is what the Lawgiver intended. This is one mode of reconciliation in reports, and an attainment of truth, complete or incomplete.

1 Aboo Haamid al-Ghazaalee.

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Chapter: On Impugnment and Preference

Note: one who seeks reconciliation cannot dispense with these two, for it has preceded that decisive proofs do not conflict. Thus, whatever conflicts with a decisive proof, whether probable or held with certainty, is impugned, and its specious argument is a veil over the truth that is removed by exposing it. Probable and non-decisive certain judgments conflict with one another; therefore, one must distinguish the indication that corresponds to, or approximates, actuality from deficient signs that are confused with it, poetic subtleties, and sophistical deceptions that become a cloud1 over the eye of the intellect. In impugnment, then, this seeker and the disputant share as does one who treats the body to restore it and one who obstinately corrupts it; the difference is that the former considers with fairness, and his concern is to choose what is sound.

1 Ghayn: a covering haze.

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Among the points impugned, and the basis for impugning them, are the statements of the adherent of a school concerning indications and subsidiary matters; and the second party's arbitrary consideration, whose concern is to impose odium so that zeal is stirred up for opposition. Its basis is what has slipped from pen or tongue, by directing it toward something far-fetched, and the opposition of what generally entails rebuke and the imputation of stupidity.

Note: Impugnment is either in the terms of a proposition, by bearing it upon other than its proper bearing; or in the proposition itself, by negation or affirmation; or in its scope, as to generality and specificity; or in its mode, such as permanence and non-permanence; or in its force, whether estimative, conjectural—weak, strong, or intermediate—or definitive, whether corresponding [to reality] or not. In truth, these return to the first four. I have expounded this more fully than here in [my work on] disputation.

Note: I had indicated many of the modes of preponderance in [my discussion of] the differing ranks of the adherents of the three paths: reason, transmission, and unveiling. When the modes of preponderance conflict, a few strong indicia take precedence over many weak ones. When they concern occurrence, they outweigh mere soundness of possibility; the ruling of a thing in its particularity [outweighs] its ruling as included within a generality; what is known as to its time [outweighs] what is unknown; and what is later in time [outweighs] what precedes it.

In sum, it is best that sound heart and upright conscience judge in this matter: that in which the heart finds repose is preferred to what is otherwise. The specification of one single mode of preponderance often differs: at one time it is sustained, and at another it is invalidated. There is no necessity to adhere to the cases of counterexamples and to strain oneself to repel them. Sound reason takes precedence over transmission, since transmission is established by reason;1 to abandon it is thus to invalidate the root by the branch. Moreover, transmission may be saved by interpretation, whereas there is no room for this in reason. Both take precedence over unveiling because of the greater ambiguities in it and the intermingling of interpretations and figurative construals therein.

Their saying, “This is a plane beyond the plane of reason,” means by it the rules which the philosophers established and called “the intelligible.” Yet these are nothing but the fruits of deficient reason, for it is beyond the plane of reason at the beginning of its acquisition, even if it receives them by way of correction and acceptance.

In sum, there is no doubt that common reason often falls short of the reality of what is unveiled and transmitted; upon such people rebuke and denial are directed. But as for the sanctified, illumined reason, nothing true contradicts it. Therefore, they agreed not to believe in the apparent meanings of the texts until possibility had been established. This is the excuse for the generality of the schools, as the gnostic said:

Excuse the war of the seventy-two sects;

Since they did not see the truth, they took the road of fable.

Note: In application itself there are degrees. The weightiest is that the matters to which the accounts of the adherents of the schools cling by their appendages be established by demonstration. Below it is that the truth in one [school] be established, and the excuses of those deficient in, and deviating from, it be made clear through their indicia. Then one begins with a sound possibility by which the schools correspond, its preponderance consisting in this very correspondence and not in another demonstration. Then one begins possibilities for application, so that certainty is attained concerning what they share: namely, that the dispute is not inevitable. Then one applies the principal matter of the chapter and disregards subsidiary matters strange to consideration.

1 In the margin of the original: “Sound reason takes precedence over transmission.”

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Note: The author of Mukhtasar al-Usool1 went to great lengths concerning the controls of impugnment and preponderance, placing all of the former and most of the latter in juridical analogy. We need not prolong the discussion of it. He considered the preponderance of transmitted materials in general, and this approximates our purpose; thus I selected from it what I found good, on the condition of brevity for greater benefit, and referred the rest to consultation there. He also digressed into preferring definitions by clarity, common recognition, and essentiality over their opposites; by the closeness of terminology to language or to 1 / 422 the Law; by the superiority of the way in which it was acquired; and the like. They differed concerning generality and specificity because of their abundant usefulness and the occurrence of agreement. He addressed the combination of modes of preponderance in twos, threes, and more, but omitted their conflict, though it is more important because of its frequent occurrence and need. The author of al-Tanqeeh2 addressed some of them.

Note: Two transmitted reports are given preponderance by chain of transmission, text, and external [considerations].

Of the first3: exceptional trustworthiness—whether in retention, such that one who agrees with the written record without relying upon it is better; in understanding, including skill in language, penetration of thought, attentiveness to indicia, and freedom from prompting; in scrupulousness and truthfulness; and in reception through audition, proximity, attentiveness of heart, and direct contact. Included in this is connectedness: the musnad takes precedence over the mursal, and the mursal of one who narrates only from a trustworthy person over another; [also] few intermediaries; explicit attribution [to the Prophet] and audition over mere meeting; and number: the mutawaatir takes precedence over the well-known report, which takes precedence over the solitary report, and the greater number of narrators over the fewer.

Of the second4: the ordering of the muhkam and the explicated, and so on to the end; the explicit expression over the indication, and so on to the end; the prohibiting over the permitting; affirmation over negation; figurative usage over equivocation; foundation over reinforcement; what conveys benefit over padding; the unrestricted over the restricted; the general over specification; retention [of the ruling] over abrogation; the detailed over the summary; what is known in date over what is not; explicit consensus over tacit consensus; and the like.

Of the third5: concomitants and corroborating evidences; the support of another proof; the explanation of a narrator who understands the indicia and knows the purposes; conformity with the narrator's practice; the abundance and quality of those who declare [him] trustworthy; their formulae; and the like.

Note: One analogy is given precedence over another through the original case, because it is definitive or stronger in conjecture, its ruling being established6 and agreed upon; through the effective cause, for the same reason and because it is affirmative,7 real, manifestly suitable, effective, determinate, constant, reversible, necessary, and not merely ameliorative or complementary; through the subsidiary case, by its sharing with the original case in the very ruling and effective cause; by the definitiveness of the existence of the effective cause in it, its inclusion of it, and its necessity for it; and over a transmitted report, if the latter is weaker than it through weakness of chain, remoteness of meaning, or the like. Some of these modes are disputed. God knows best what is correct.

1 The well-known books of usool include Usool al-Bazdawee; its author is Fakhr al-Islaam 'Alee ibn Muhammad al-Bazdawee, the Hanafee, who died in 482 AH. We have not identified the author of the Usool mentioned by the author.

2 It is Tanqeeh al-Usool by Sadr al-Sharee'ah 'Ubayd Allaah Mas'ood al-Mahboobee al-Bukhaaree, the Hanafee, who died in 747 AH = 1345 CE.

3 Above it, between the lines: “the chain of transmission.”

4 Above it, between the lines: “that is, the text.”

5 Above it, between the lines: “that is, the external [considerations].”

6 Above it, between the lines: “that is, attestation of trustworthiness.”

7 Above it, between the lines: “that is, the latter.”

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Section: Examples of application, to clarify for the deluded and train the understanding person

Note on affirming and denying the atom: They defined it as a substance having position that admits neither actual, imaginal, nor rational division. They agreed that the first two terminate at the utmost limit of smallness, but differed concerning the third. Since the philosophers made reason a real receptacle, the necessary correspondence between the division of the small and the large in parallel bodies, and of the swift and the slow in motions, was for them a real division that does not stop at a limit. Since the theologians denied this, the meaning of rational division for them was that reason judges its occurrence externally. In their argument for it, they stated that God—exalted is He—is able over all possibilities and divisions, since no subsequent division is made conditional upon a prior one, and they are possible together. Thus, if God—exalted is He—brings every possible division into existence, then either that division is divided, which entails an absurdity, or else it is not divided, which entails the atom. The philosophers did not claim that all of these occur externally without end; rather, they established a general judgment through the distinctness of the extremities. The theologians acknowledged that six contacts subsist in it, so they did not prevent the distinctness of the extremities. The difference between it and Democritean bodies is that in the atom the impediment is smallness alone, whereas in those it is that together with solidity. Thus there is no dispute in one respect. After admitting the possibility of the atom, the theologians did not initially establish that bodies are composed of it; the assertion of its possibility does not entail this, as Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Kareem al-Shahrastaanee1 held. Yet they did affirm it in order to delimit distance, for their concern was only to validate the principles of the revealed laws.

and the sages, when they wished to verify the truths, prefaced their discussion with investigations. Thus, he disputed with the Peripatetics about Democritus in refuting his doctrine, then with Plato in establishing prime matter; thereafter they derived from these premises conclusions that the theologians deemed objectionable and, according to their exposition, contrary to the foundations of the revealed laws. The theologians therefore dispensed with their burden. This is like Ptolemy's statement: “We do not establish a [celestial] interval in astronomy, nor has it been demonstrated by proof whether the Maker—glorious is His majesty—made anything in it beyond what is necessary to regulate the motions.” Understand this.

An Observation: They differed over whether place is a surface or a dimension, but agreed that it is the thing with respect to which one points from here and there. When one points to a place and then to another, there is certainly a dimension between them. The Illuminationists took notice of this and drew attention to its existence: in a small quantity of space, bodies occupy it in correspondence with their volumes.

The Peripatetics said: It is an imagined entity; that dimension belongs only to bodies. Thus one imagines the successive, equal bodies that occupy it to be one and the same, enduring. They thereby acknowledged that there is, between here and there, an imagined dimension occupied by extended things, into which their dimensions imaginatively penetrate. This is the doctrine of the theologians. Whether this imagination is ascribed to the container or to the contained, its basis is the container, for by it the equality of successive contained things is known.

1 He is Aboo al-Fath Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Kareem ibn Ahmad al-Shahrastaanee, one of the philosophers of Islam and an imaam in theology, the religions of nations, and the doctrines of the philosophers. Among his works on these subjects is “The Religions and Sects” [al-Milal wa-l-nihal]: 479–548 AH = 1086–1153 CE.

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The theologians do not deny that a body has a surface in contact with another body; in anything other than what is posited as delimited, the two necessarily accompany one another. The only dispute that remains is whether this¹ or that is more deserving of the name, while customary containment encompasses both. Before the body comes to be in it, both are imagined; afterward, the dimension is imagined and the surface exists, so they gave preference to it on that account. Their statement, “Place is that by which bodies are distinguished in pointing, whether it is a position or a place,” is problematic in that one does not say “the body is in the position”³ as one says “it is in the place.” Pointing by “here” and “there” is to place, not to position; and although position accompanies it, it necessarily involves attention to a distinct thing, whereas “here” and “there” require no distinct thing.

The Illuminationists understood that just as the basis of priority and posteriority in themselves is time, the basis of smallness and largeness is magnitude, and the basis of paucity and multitude is number, so too the basis, in itself, of what is pointed to by “here” and “there” must be that upon which motion, and upon its postulated parts, is intrinsically impossible. For place is delimited before transfer, so rarefaction, condensation, separation, the actual occurrence of boundaries, and every matter additional to the dimension and its mensurability are impossible for it. If it were a surface, it would be receptive to these as properties of its locus. Were this not so, what is pointed to in the thickness of a body by a transfer from here to there—whether its existence were actual or nearly potential—would require that the conception of its transfer be dependent upon the conception of things external to it. If, then, the whole world were assumed to move with one positional motion, its parts would not have any translational motion at all, since their positions would remain preserved.

The Illuminationists, having become accustomed to contemplating the subtle lights and the imaginal things, found its conception easy.

This was obscure to the Peripatetics, so they turned to refuting it. At times they argued that the dimensions are alike, and that whatever is possible for one is possible for another; hence, if a dimension required matter in bodies in itself, all dimensions would require it, and would become bodies. You have learned⁴ that likeness is negated by the explanation of its properties. At other times they argued that the impossibility of interpenetration belongs to dimensionality⁵: if it were a bare dimension, it would be impossible for a body to move through it from one place to another. It is evident that, according to them, interpenetration in indivisible substances is impossible; therefore occupying a place independently is certainly the cause. If one supposes that there is, in magnitudes, something that entails it, that too is impossible on account of that cause, and there is no need for another cause. We do not find an impossible interpenetration that does not entail it, such that a second cause might be established, although what is mentioned by agreement in defining interpenetration is the entry of two occupants into one place; no one has said that an occupant's entry into a second part of a place is [interpenetration]. As for the Soofees, they witnessed, in every domain of the unseen and the witnessed, a time and a place different from those in another domain. 'Ayn al-Qudhaat explained this in his epistle on the temporal and spatial, and left it without comment, since the purpose was merely illustration, not an intention to establish its reality.

The theologians therefore accompany the Peripatetics at the outset and return to the Illuminationists at the end, calling it imagined because of a principle that may be gleaned from their words: they defined it as imagined emptiness occupied by an occupant, and their followers explained this as sheer nothingness. This is contradicted by their statement: “If the Necessary were an occupant, it would entail either the eternity of place or that He—exalted is He—be the locus of originated events.”

1 Above it, between the lines: “That is, a surface. [From him].”

2 Above it, between the lines: “That is, an imagined dimension.”

3 Above it, between the lines: “That is, in existence.”

4 In the margin of the original: “This is the answer to the Peripatetics' argument.”

5 Above it, between the lines: “That is, place.”

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Their statement that position exists—that is, being in a place, which they divided into connection, separation, motion, and rest—shows that there is no meaning to existence in sheer nothingness. Thus it is not like calling the place pointed to, the dated time divided [into units], the measured magnitude, and the enumerated and divided number imagined, any more than calling the covering of a felt over the disk of the sun [imagined]. It has also been said that what is in the jug is imagined.³ Rather, it is understood from the contexts of their usage, even if they did not state it explicitly, that the entities and sensible meanings accessible to the common or the select, and the things upon which they depend, are existent for them; while other things that attach to them—such as these matters, relations, contracts, and the five rulings—are imagined for them, with effects in the external world. They are not among the mental entities whose existence they denied because of their sharing in the property of impossibles. Their doctrine, then, is close to that of the Illuminationists. Let this meaning be retained, for it is highly useful in this chapter.⁴

An Observation on Time: They agreed that time is the thing divided into days, months, and years. It is other than the darkness of night and the light of day, which are perceived by sight, and other than the sun and moon, upon which the matter of days, months, and years revolves. It is a nonstationary entity.

The sages first said: It is that by which priority and posteriority are understood, in which the before and after do not coexist in themselves. Then, after further reflection, they said: It is a continuous, nonstationary quantity. They reflected further and said: It is the measure of motion. They reflected further and said: It is the measure of an eternal positional motion of the sphere encompassing the whole, swifter than all motions.

The theologians said: It is a renewed estimation imagined in accordance with a known renewal. By “estimation” they did not mean our act, for time is not among our acts; nor did they mean the renewed things themselves, for these are either stationary substances or accidents, and none of them is time. Rather, they meant an imagined matter according to which one renewed thing is measured by another renewed thing. This is likewise the position of the sages, for the people of moderate intellect among the sages and the theologians agreed that the successive motion to which time corresponds is something inscribed in the imagination from the intermediate motion; and that the connection of the nonexistent with the nonexistent is impossible. They also agreed that motion is the renewed thing that passes away in itself. It is as though they said: It is a matter according to which, and with reference to which, the succession of the states of motion is measured as prior and posterior.⁵ The theologians did not agree with them in their further investigations, because these involved meanings and derivations they did not accept; and restricting oneself to a single designation among several aspects should not be counted as a genuine dispute.

The Illuminationists agreed with the discerning Peripatetics that it exists eternally and that its essence is continuous, being the measure of motion. Yet, just as they claimed that the continuous bodily dimension is a substantial magnitude, they also claimed that the nonstationary dimension is a substantial magnitude, since they did not find it to be an intrinsic qualifying nature, nor did they find in it the meaning of inherence. Thus one does not say “time is in motion” as one says “speed is in motion,” or “color, dimension, and motion are in the body.” Nor did they find the particular positional motion to have any role in constituting it.

1 Above it, between the lines: “A copula noun.”

2 Above it, between the lines: “Predicate.”

3 Above it, between the lines: “Second object of 'calling.'”

4 That is, the chapter on application.

5 Above it, between the two lines: “That is, the discontinuous one.”

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Because the qualitative psychic motion, which is prior in itself to the positional one, lacks it; because they did not find it to multiply with the multiplication of motions, although both are measured by it; because it is impossible for a thing to be measured in itself by that which subsists through another; and because its existence is farther removed from accepting nonexistence than the place in which it is, the bearer of that place, and that which constitutes its bearer—for this would entail its existing by itself in the supposition of nonexistence, without those things, whereas the existence of an accident in itself is its existence in its substratum—so that when existence inheres in a thing, it ceases to exist when that thing ceases to exist, and is thus more opposed to nonexistence than it is.

As for the Peripatetics: when they proceeded in proving it by measuring motions through it, and since magnitude, in their view, was nothing other than what they had definitively judged to be an accident, they treated the indications of substantiality as customary and conjectural improbabilities, then went to extremes in claiming that every motion constituted it.

As for the later exacting theologians: since they acknowledged the origination of the entire world, they divided time into two: an existent thing, which is the measure of renewals and motions; and an imagined thing, which they made—because minds are accustomed to it—the basis of the Necessary's temporal pre-eternity and a receptacle for the nonexistence of time. For nonexistence is not a realized, renewed thing that would require an existent time. They compared it to the constant, realized distance from the center to the outermost sphere, and to the distance imagined from it to infinity. These, then, have followed something of the methods of application. Understand this, and know that applying the words of these two skilled authorities in refinement and discrimination to one another is difficult for anyone else. And God knows best.

An observation: They differed over the Sunnah of raising the hands in prayer after the opening takbeer, despite agreeing that no command establishing its desirability, no statement of its merit, and no prohibition of it was ever authentically reported; and despite agreeing that it is established that the Prophet—God bless him and grant him peace—did it for a period. Yet Ibn Mas'ood—may God be pleased with him—went further, saying: “Shall I not pray for you the prayer of the Messenger of God—God bless him and grant him peace?” Then he did not raise his hands except the first time. Plainly, he did not intend never to do it again; rather, he intended to leave it at the end, as is suggested by something transmitted from him: that the last of the two practices was leaving the raising. The duration of the omission is unknown, and it is possible that he omitted it during the days of illness because of weakness. Some people therefore supposed that its being a Sunnah rested merely on the act, and that it was nullified by the omission. Others held that omission with an excuse, and without prohibition, does not negate its being a Sunnah, like omitting the obligatory standing because of an excuse. It thus remains, and there is no disputing the jurists over its being a Sunnah in general, nor over the continued permissibility of performing it, even though some partisans prohibited it, since it is not among the actions that contradict the prayer, as it remains in the opening takbeer, the qunoot, and the two festivals. Thus no one may censure the person who performs it; rather, the issue concerns the continuation of its being a Sunnah on the basis of conjecture. There is no disagreement except over regular observance1 and preponderance. Since a group regularly observed it, reaching the level of widespread transmission beyond mere notoriety, and the Prophet—God bless him and grant him peace—did not address their practice as he addressed raising the hands at the salutation, when he said: “Why do I see your hands as the tails of restive horses?” The Prophet—God bless him and grant him peace—could see behind him as he could see before him. The continued status of the practice as a Sunnah is therefore established, while his sometimes leaving it—as transmitted by Ibn Mas'ood—may God be pleased with him—and al-Baraa' b. 'Aazib—may God be pleased with him—and his not addressing the person who left it indicate that its emphasis was dropped. The report of this group did not reach Aboo Haneefa—may God have mercy on him. Rather, al-Awzaa'ee narrated to him from Ibn Shihaab, from Saalim, from Ibn 'Umar—may God be pleased with them both—so Aboo Haneefa preferred over it the chain Hammaad, from Ibraaheem, from 'Alqama, from Ibn Mas'ood, on account of greater legal understanding, not greater memorization. It was as though he supposed that Ibn Mas'ood had noticed the abrogation, unlike Ibn 'Umar, since he raised his hands only at the opening takbeer, on the basis that silence in a context requiring clarification conveys restriction. What is mentioned about al-Shaafi'ee—may God have mercy on him—not raising his hands at his grave suggests a lack of emphasis.2

1 Above it, between the two lines: “Until the end of the prayer.”

2 Above it, between the two lines: “That is, the ruling.”

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An observation: They differed over the Prophet's—God bless him and grant him peace—ritual observance: whether he performed the pilgrimage as a single pilgrimage, as qiraan, or as tamattu' while driving the sacrificial animal. The way to reconcile the reports is that when the Prophet gathered the people and departed from al-Madeena al-Munawwara for Makka al-Mu'adhdhama, he intended only the pilgrimage. When he spent the night at Dhoo al-Hulayfa in al-'Aqeeq, he ordered qiraan, saying: “Here I am, for a pilgrimage and an 'umra.” When he entered Makka and recalled the Arabs' ignorance that performing the 'umra in the months of the pilgrimage was among the gravest forms of wickedness, and realized that this was his final 'umra and that he would not live until the following year, he wished to dispel this misconception in the most emphatic manner. He therefore ordered the people to dissolve their consecration for the pilgrimage and make it an 'umra, saying: “Had I known at the beginning of my affair what I know at its end, I would not have driven the sacrificial animal, and I would have released myself from consecration along with the people as they released themselves.” Thus he was performing a single pilgrimage with respect to his initial intention and public renown; performing qiraan with respect to his talbiya at al-'Aqeeq, where the Prophet—God bless him and grant him peace—ordered, in this blessed valley: “And say 'umra within a pilgrimage”; and performing tamattu' while driving the sacrificial animal with respect to his resolve and desire. No renewal of consecration for the pilgrimage on the Day of Tarwiya was transmitted. Yes, renewal of the talbiya is known when setting out for 'Arafa from Minaa. Thus he was truly performing qiraan, single in the first stage of the matter, and performing tamattu' at its end.

An observation: It is reported in one hadeeth: “There is no contagion”; and in another: “Flee from the leper as you flee from a lion.”

They differed over how to reconcile them. It was said: “There is no contagion” means no independent cause, while “flee from the leper” is because contact with him is one of the customary causes by which God Most High creates illness, like all neglect of precautions and adoption of what contradicts a sound temperament. It was denied in this case, rather than in the others, because the nature of its effect had not become clear: it was imagined as a dominating spiritual force, or as independent. It was also said: “There is no contagion” applies in reality, while “flee from the leper” means taking precautions against places of suspicion and misconception. And it was said: “There is no contagion” applies in the ruling of the Law, so the one who transmits disease is not liable for the harm he causes, nor may vengeance be taken upon him; while “flee from the leper” means protecting your body from a malignant illness that is difficult to cure.

One group of Sufis said that there is unity of being, meaning that in the external world there is nothing but the Essence of the Real alone, and everything called other or besides is only a mode of His manifestation and a delimitation of His attributes.

Another group said that there is no relation between the Real and creation except the relation of bringing into existence; there is neither identity nor unity at all between them. Among those who affirm unity, some said that this applies to witnessing and inner experience, not to reality, and there is no quarrel with them, since this experiential identity can coexist with absolute real otherness, as the stars disappear from sight when the sun rises and the day intensifies, or as redness appears over the world when a red glass is placed over the eye. Whoever believes that this is so in reality reconciles the matter according to his belief by saying that there are two perspectives on the world:

One perspective considers the aspect by which realities are distinct. This is nothing but a negative aspect; and how could nonbeing unite? He therefore emphasized the distinctness of realities, their falling into the shadow of illusions, and the purity of the Face of the Real from the dust of worlds and understandings. He said: “He is beyond beyond,” and so on. He thus judged that every relation was severed except the shadow-like relation of the attributes and the bringing into existence of the mirrors of essences. At that point this accords with the path of those who ground their claims in witnessing. No one claims that contingently possible things unite with the level of unconditioned oneness and the sheer Essence.

The second perspective considers the world in terms of its being encompassed by the sustaining agency of the Real and existing through the permeation of His effusion, inasmuch as He is closer to them than the jugular vein. In relation to the Real, this is like images reflected in His mirror, or imagined waves and forms within His comprehensiveness and expansiveness. He therefore did not affirm for the world an entity other than the entity of the Real, and said: “He is the very identity of everything in manifestation,” not that He is the identity of things in their essences. Rather, He is He, and things are things. The one who grounds his claim in witnessing does not deny that the world's existence subsists through the sustaining agency of the Real—a sustaining agency existing for an imagined thing, not comparable to the soul's sustaining agency for the body or the substance's for the accident, but more intense and stronger than that, without interpenetration, mixture, or confinement. One expresses this by “bringing into existence” and “creating,” but not as a builder creates a building or as the specific forms entail...

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of the symptoms. As for expressing it by “it is it” or “it is not it,” this does not alter any actual relation; it is merely a way of expressing the precise meaning. Is there not one relation, validly affirmed, between three and singleness, such that one may say at one time, “Three is singular,” and at another, “Threeness is a concept, and singleness is an accident attaching to it”? We have explained this meaning in The Refutation of Falsehood at sufficient length; whoever desires more may consult it. As for some of the shuhoodiyya who said that the world is a real, independent external existence, other than the Necessary, produced by His act, and some of the wujoodiyya who said that the Necessary is none other than this particular structure called “the world”—that it is a world by virtue of the multiplicity of its parts and Real by virtue of the unity of their composition—they stand at opposite extremes, yet the aforementioned secret brings them together, while the limited vision of each group distinguishes between them.

Note: The basis of the dispute between the two groups, as summarized by the imam of the shuhoodiyya,1 is whether the shadow is identical with, or other than, its original in reality and correspondence. One should reflect that the shadow of knowledge is knowledge and nothing else, and likewise with the other attributes. He himself also explicitly states that the rationalists' rule—that the quiddity of a thing is that by which the thing is what it is—is not admitted with respect to a shadow-quiddity: the shadow is through its original, not through itself, and its original is closer to it than it is to itself. At that point, no appreciable difference remains between this and the wujoodiyya's statement that “the shadow is the manifestation of a thing in the second rank and those thereafter,” except in expression. For, according to the shuhoodiyya, each takes the rank together with the reality, and so they differ; whereas according to the wujoodiyya it takes the rank without stipulating it, and so they are identical. The source of this is that one gives greater attention to the aspect of distinction and the other to the aspect of commonality, while each is heedless of the other. Thus identity is established from one perspective, and otherness from another.

Note: The scholars and the shuhoodee Sufis agree that prophethood is superior to sainthood. Thus the prophet is protected from sins, secure in his final state, his knowledge is certain, and acceptance of him is obligatory; denial of him is unbelief, unlike denial of the saint. God—Glorified and Exalted is He—said: {But righteousness is [the quality of] one who believes in God, the Last Day, the angels, the Scripture, and the prophets}. He did not mention the saints alongside them.

The wujoodiyya said that sainthood is superior to prophethood. Since uttering this was weighty and objectionable, it was explained to mean that they are two aspects of one person among the prophets: sainthood is his turning wholly toward the Real, while prophethood is his turning toward creation, with a command without intermediary. The aspect of the Real is nobler than the aspect of creation, and from this they extracted the claim that prophethood is superior while sainthood is nobler.

The shuhoodiyya disputed this, arguing that prophethood is not itself the conveying and educating, but rather the receiving of revelation from Him—Glorified is He—for the purpose of conveying; it is therefore an aspect of the Real, not of creation. They also argued that prophethood is the goal of sainthood and the completion of its perfection, and is therefore superior to it; and that turning toward creation, by acting as the Real's deputy and instrument—by placing oneself within the Real and as His aspect—differs from turning toward the Real, which occurs by placing oneself outside the Real and facing Him. The renewer Shaykh—may God have mercy on him—recognized that their purpose was this: through knowledge of existential monism, one attains the removal of duality, complete annihilation, and perfect union, as occurs with the saints; one does not attain these in the judgments of the servant and the worshipped, with the preservation of proper etiquette and complete obedience, as called for by the prophets—peace be upon them—and as transmitted in their inherited way among the scholars. He dispelled this by explaining that the way of sainthood and its perfections are shadow-like, whereas both are original to prophethood. His explanation, as I understood it, is that the prophetic way, at its beginning and its end, surpasses the way of sainthood in both; the prophets' turning toward the external Ipseity occurs without the mediation of a barzakh or mirror from the selves and horizons, and their end is the existential manifestations, culminating in the establishment of the relation of receptivity, deputyship, and protection.

1 Above it, between the two lines: “Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindee.”

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at the hand of Him in whose hands is the order of divine decree and determination. He then arranges their effects in the external world. The saints' turning toward Him—Glorified is He—takes place through the mediation of the barzakh and the mirrors of the selves and horizons. Whoever among them goes beyond this has entered, incidentally, into the inheritance of prophethood. Their end is subsistence through the Real, yet the effects of divinity and necessity are never attributed to them, except in their perception and experience, and in undertaking the requirements of following the prophets according to its seven degrees. Although they share in attaining His—Exalted is He—manifestations in the perceptual mirrors and in receiving from Him—Glorified is He—without an intermediary, the truth is that sainthood is distinguished by length of subsistence, breadth of scope, and the role of effort and acquisition within it; prophethood is distinguished by the attainment of a kind of independence, greater particular privilege and rank, and the strengthening of the bond with Him. When the saint enters into his own egotism, he enters the levels of absoluteness and penetrates the realities of things, and an aspect of the Essence may be unveiled to him that perhaps remains hidden from the prophet. The prophet, however, must recognize it through the mediation of transmission and by combining his vision with his speech; this is not the case with the saint. Yet the clear truth is that the follower is below the followed.

....................................... ... And people have various ways in what they love.

One source of confusion is that what is later in attainment changes in the estimation of its possessor. Moreover, this discussion concerns pure prophethood and particular sainthood. Whoever has attained, along with these, another kind of perfection, or a combination of kinds of perfection, should be assessed with respect to the superiority of each perfection and of their combination in him; one should not restrict the matter to what has been stated.

Note: The philosophers claimed that rupture and rejoining are impossible for the celestial spheres, while the authorities of the revealed laws disagreed with them on this. The truth is that the philosophers produced no proof for it. Even if the arguments cited were complete, they would establish only the impossibility of rupture and rejoining in the determination of places and times; the remaining spheres have no bearing on this. They judged thus because those spheres fall under the name “sphere” and agree with it in circular motion, which they presumed to be perpetual. They did not know that the perpetual circular inclination of the whole does not preclude a straight inclination in its parts, especially in those parts that are separate.

Sadr al-Deen al-Sheeraazee1 explicitly stated that this judgment of theirs was based on a kind of conjecture, and that this conjecture was nothing more than the mind's immediate apprehension, not a conclusion from the premises of a demonstration. The people of the revealed law were certain that the spheres had originated from substances sharing their fundamental basis with the elements.

1 He is Sadr al-Deen Muhammad ibn Ibraaheem al-Qawwaamee al-Sheeraazee, a philosopher among those who held the doctrine of the unity of being, with many works on the subject. He died in 1059 AH = 1649 CE.

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Note: The philosophers attributed atmospheric phenomena to changes in air and water through transformations, inversions, and mixtures, while the authorities of the revealed laws attributed them to angels acting by God's command. An apparent contradiction between them thus emerges, but there is no contradiction: things have four causes. The philosophers attended to the material cause, while the authorities of the revealed laws attended to the efficient cause. How could it be otherwise? The philosophers themselves cannot dispense with unseen celestial causes, which ordinary people call “particular configurations” and their more select thinkers call “spiritual powers.” The agent acts only by assembling and preparing the materials, as we observe in our own actions, so denial is unwarranted. It is also known from the Torah that vapor rises from the face of the earth and waters its regions. Once it has been established that these powers descend from heaven, it is sound to say that water descends from heaven, and it is permissible that “heaven” be intended to mean the layer of bitter cold, in which the congealed cold is the mountains of hail; with it He strikes whom He wills and turns it away from whom He wills.

Note: The authorities of the revealed laws understand such statements of the Exalted—{the earth as a spread} and {He spread it out} and {it was flattened}—to mean that it is a flat surface, while the philosophers establish its sphericity through sound proofs. The disagreement is only apparent and is dispelled by noting that the perceptible portion of it in every region is a flat surface: the larger the circle, the less its parts appear to curve. Its flatness is therefore in consideration of the perceptibility of its parts, and its sphericity in consideration of the intelligibility of it as a whole.

Point: It is related in the hadeeth that when the sun sets, it goes until it prostrates beneath the Throne. The philosophers have established that it does not depart from its place in the sphere when it is beneath the earth. Thus, if the Throne is understood as encompassing, it is always beneath the Throne; and if it is understood as being above only, then it has not gone to it. The resolution of the disagreement is that the philosophers have established the difference of its states in relation to the lower bodies at the four cardinal points.1 Thus, in the inner selves of those whose souls are purified and whose hearts are illumined is impressed the state of one sitting at sunrise, the state of one standing at the zenith, the state of one bowing at sunset, and the state of one prostrating at the utmost descent. In all of this it is beneath the Throne, because it is always above and encompassing it.

Point: In the Glorious Mushaf occurs: {And He cast firmly set mountains into the earth, lest it should shake with you} {And the mountains as pegs}.

And in the noble hadeeth: “The earth was created shaking upon the water; the angels held it, but it did not become still. So God—Glorified be He—created the mountains, and through them it became still.” The philosophers have established that heavy bodies are drawn toward the centre of the world, which is the centre of the earth and the water. Thus the water is above the earth, supported upon it from every direction toward its centre. How then could it shake upon it? And the mountains are in the earth: if it inclined, they would incline with it; so how could they prevent it from moving? The correspondence is that it is a certain sensible fact among the people of India that when a well is dug, one reaches the moist soil, and water seeps into it from the sides, like sweat from pores, slowly or quickly. When one goes deep into it,2 one comes to a hard layer into which water does not enter at all. Then, when one goes further by breaking through it, pure fresh water gushes forth with force and intensity, as though it had been compressed and then risen. If thousands of buckets are drawn from it, it does not diminish; and they have found no end to this water for four hundred or five hundred cubits. God knows how much water lies beyond it. There is no doubt that beneath it is another earthly layer. It is as though the earth shakes upon this water, not upon the water spread over it; and the roots of the mountains are set in the second layer of earth, not in this earth alone. Understand this.

Point: In the Glorious Speech occurs: {God is He who created seven heavens, and of the earth their like}, that is, the like of the seven heavens.

And it is stated in the hadeeth that they are separate layers. The proofs of astronomy indicate that the earth's diameter is two thousand, five hundred and forty-five farsakhs. This could not contain within it seven earths near the size of this earth; so what do you think if the lower one is greater than the upper, as is related? And no other earth exists between heaven and earth. Although this does not decisively contradict the verse, because “earth” is singular and the partitive min is included, it is understood that those seven are portions of one earth. And so they are: its inhabited part consists of seven lands differing in religions, customs, temperaments, plants, and some animals: one for the blacks, namely the Berbers, the Zanj, and the Abyssinians; another for the whites, namely the Franks, the people of Tangier, and the Slavs; then one for the Arabs, then for the Persians, then for India, then for the Turks, then for China. Or “earth” may be construed as referring to the realms of the elements, which are seven layers. As for

1 In the margin of the original: “They are the ascendant, the descendant, the tenth, and the fourth.”

2 Above it, between the lines: “That is, in digging.”

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construing it as the climes, that is remote; yet it contradicts the explicit hadeeth. This disagreement is repelled by saying that six earths are in the layers of the World of Images, as though they were six likenesses of this earth. The common people and the adherents of revealed laws distinguish between perceptible and imaginal bodies only by attributes, such as fineness and density, luminosity and darkness. This is supported by what is related from Ibn 'Abbaas—may God be pleased with them both—that therein is an Ibn 'Abbaas like your Ibn 'Abbaas. It may be supposed that those earths are the impressions of it formed in the celestial souls. Against this is that, if the matter is expanded, the earths are ten, unless one laboriously maintains that, just as the earth has no sensible magnitude in relation to the upper spheres, it has no form above the sphere of Jupiter. Its remoteness is not hidden. This is the end of what I have transmitted from the Book of Completion.

As for the report of Ibn 'Abbaas to which he alluded, al-Haakim related it in al-Mustadrak through Shareek, from 'Ataa' ibn al-Saa'ib, from Aboo al-Dhuhaa, from Ibn 'Abbaas—may God be pleased with him—in the interpretation of His saying, Exalted is He: {and of the earth their like}. He said: Seven earths; in every earth a prophet like your prophet, an Adam like your Adam, a Noah like Noah, an Abraham like Abraham, and a Jesus like Jesus. These wordings1 contain transposition and reversal in some routes.

Al-Haakim said: This hadeeth has a sound chain of transmission. Badr al-Shiblee said in Aakaam al-Marjaan fee Ahkaam al-Jaan: Our shaykh al-Dhahabee said: Its chain is fair. al-Haakim also related it through 'Amr ibn Murrah, from Aboo al-Dhuhaa, with the wording: “In every earth there is the like of Abraham.” He said: This hadeeth meets the conditions of al-Bukhaaree and Muslim; and al-Dhahabee agreed with him that it meets their conditions, adding: Its men are imaams. This was related by the pupil of Badr al-Deen al-Hanafee in al-Aakaam. al-Bayhaqee also related it in Shu'ab al-Eemaan and Kitaab al-Asmaa' wa-l-Sifaat, and said: Its chain is sound, but it is exceedingly anomalous, and I know of no corroborating narrator for Aboo al-Dhuhaa regarding it. al-Suyootee said in al-Haawee: This statement of al-Bayhaqee is exceedingly good, for the soundness of the chain does not entail the soundness of the text, as has been established in the sciences of hadeeth; for a chain may be sound while the text contains an anomaly or a defect that prevents its soundness. Once the weakness of the hadeeth is established, this dispenses with interpretation, because weak hadeeths are not accepted in such a matter. It may be interpreted to mean the warners who conveyed to the jinn from the prophets of humankind; and it is not far-fetched for each of them to be named after the prophet on whose behalf he conveyed—God, Glorified and Exalted, knows best. End.

Ibn Jareer2 related it in his commentary through 'Amr ibn Murrah, from Aboo al-Dhuhaa, with the wording: “In every earth is the like of Abraham and the like of what is upon the earth.” al-'Asqalaanee and al-Qastallaanee said: Thus he transmitted it in abridged form, and its chain is sound. End.

Al-Suyootee mentioned it in al-Durr al-Manthoor and attributed it to Ibn Abee Haatim. In al-Tadreeb, discussing the first route, he said: I continued to be astonished at al-Haakim's authentication until I saw al-Bayhaqee say: … etc.

Al-Qastallaanee said: In it is [the point] that the soundness of the chain does not entail the soundness of the text, as is known among the people of this discipline; the chain may be sound while the text contains an anomaly or a defect impugning its soundness. Such a matter is not established by a weak hadeeth. Similar is found in Rooh al-Bayaan, and likewise in the Seerah of al-Halabee. In al-Bidaayah it says: This is to be understood, if its transmission is sound,

1 Opposite it in the margin: “But in none of them is there the wording: 'an Ibn 'Abbaas like your Ibn 'Abbaas,' which he mentioned in al-Takmeel. From it.”

2 al-Tabaree, died in 310 AH.

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as meaning that Ibn 'Abbaas took it from the Israa'eeliyyaat. al-Sakhaawee said in al-Maqaasid al-Hasanah: That is, sayings of the Children of Israel mentioned in the Torah, or taken from their scholars and shaykhs, as in Sharh al-Nukhbah. Thus, if an infallible one has not reported it and its chain to him is sound, it is rejected against its speaker. End.

In al-Kamaalayn, the marginal commentary on al-Jalaalayn, it is transmitted from Ibn Katheer, the pupil of Shaykh al-Islaam Ibn Taymiyyah—may God have mercy on him—what has preceded from al-Bidaayah. The wording of 'Alee al-Qaaree in his abridged work on fabricated reports, entitled al-Masnoo', transmitting from al-Haafidh Ibn Katheer, is: Such reports and their like, if their chain to an infallible one is not sound, are rejected against their speaker. End.

Al-Halabee said in Insaan al-'Uyoon, after transmitting al-Bayhaqee's statement: The soundness of the chain does not entail the soundness of the text, for despite the soundness of its chain it may contain something preventing its soundness; thus it is weak. End.

The like is found in the commentary of Qaadhee Thanaa' Allaah called al-Madhharee, as has been said, and al-Zurqaanee also declared it weak.

In the commentary al-Bahr al-Muheet1: There is no doubt that it is fabricated. al-Shawkaanee mentioned it in his commentary Fath al-Qadeer, adding only al-Bayhaqee's statement: In its chain is 'Ataa' ibn al-Saa'ib, who is among those whose reports became confused, as al-Nawawee explicitly stated in the introduction to his commentary on Muslim.

Al-Haafidh said in al-Taqreeb: Trustworthy, though prone to error.

And in Hudaa al-Saaree, the introduction to Fath al-Baaree: He became confused, so they declared him weak on that account.

Yahyaa ibn Ma'een said: His hadeeth is not used as proof. al-Bukhaaree narrated from him only as corroboration in one place along with Aboo Bishr, and Muslim did not narrate from him.

Al-Haakim said in the chapter on eclipses in al-Mustadrak: “The two did not transmit it because of 'Ataa' ibn al-Saa'ib.” End.

What is astonishing is how al-Haakim judged it sound, while knowing that the two Shaykhs did not transmit any hadeeth of 'Ataa', and that this report is from his narration. It is therefore all the more deserving of being declared weak. al-Mundhiree said in the book al-Targheeb: “'Ataa' ibn al-Saa'ib al-Thaqafee: Ahmad said, 'He is trustworthy and a righteous man. Whoever heard from him early, [his narration] was sound; and whoever heard from him late, [his narration] was of no account. The narration of Shu'bah, al-Thawree, and Hammaad ibn Zayd from him is good.'” al-Tahdheeb adds: “Among those who heard from him early, before he changed, were Shu'bah, Shareek, and Hammaad.” Yet Yahyaa ibn Ma'een said: “Everyone who narrated from 'Ataa' narrated from him during his confusion, except Shu'bah and Sufyaan.” Thus it is established that Shareek heard from him in the state of confusion and change, rather than before it; and this weak report is from Shareek's narration from 'Ataa'.

Al-Qastallaanee said: “Assuming it to be established, it is possible that the meaning is: then those who follow him and are called by these names; they are the messengers of the messengers who convey [the message] to the jinn from the prophets of God, and each of them is called by the name of the prophet on whose behalf he conveys it.” End.

Al-Suyootee—may God have mercy on him—added: “Accordingly, our Prophet—may God bless and grant him peace—had among the jinn one whose name was like his name; perhaps what is intended is his well-known name, namely Muhammad—may God bless and grant him peace. So let this be considered.” The like of this occurs in the exegesis Rooh al-Bayaan, and something similar in Insaan al-'Uyoon, quoting from

1 In the margin of the original: “This is how we found it, and we have not come across this exegesis. If the judgment regarding the narration of al-Waaqidee is based on this, then it is of no account; but if it is based on something else, then it should be examined. From him.”

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al-Suyootee. Ibn 'Arabee, in al-Futoohaat, construed it as the world of images, saying: “God created, among the totality of its worlds, beings in our form; when the gnostic sees, he beholds himself in them.” Ibn 'Abbaas indicated something similar in what is narrated from him concerning this Ka'bah, namely that it is one house among fourteen houses, and that in every one of the seven earths there are creatures like us, such that among them is an Ibn 'Abbaas like me. This narration has been deemed authentic by the people of unveiling. End.

The author of al-Takmeel construed it in this way—as has preceded—and accordingly there is nothing in it that benefits those who adduce it as evidence. A suspended report is not a hadeeth according to the critics and those knowledgeable in the science of hadeeth, such that it may be adduced as proof in rulings and exegeses according to the majority.

Al-Shawkaanee said in al-Sayl al-Jarraar: “The Companions' exegesis of a verse does not constitute proof, especially when it differs.” End.

This report has come regarding the beginning of creation, not matters of creed such that a doctrine may be built upon it. It requires application, interpretation, correction of its meaning, and establishment of its basis. What is authoritative in matters of creed is definitive, not speculative, proofs, as the scholars of kalaam have stated explicitly. al-Raazee said in al-Kabeer: “Belief ought to be founded upon certainty. How can speculation be followed in a matter of such magnitude? The nobler and graver a matter is, the more necessary and fitting caution concerning it becomes.” End.

Accordingly, support for this weak or fabricated report should not be sought in what is mentioned in al-'Araa'is and Badaa'i' al-Zuhoor about the existence of creatures in the remaining layers of the earth, since it is contradictory, fabricated, and narrated from the Israa'eeliyyaat. al-Naysaabooree said in his exegesis: “Al-Tha'labee mentioned in his exegesis a section concerning the creatures of the heavens and the earths, their forms, and their names. We have refrained from relating it due to lack of confidence in those narrations.” End.

Al-Khafaajee said in his marginal commentary on al-Baydhaawee: “This matter is not among the necessities of religion, such that one who denies it or hesitates about it should be declared an unbeliever. What we believe is that they are seven layers, and that they have inhabitants among His creatures, whom God knows.” End.

Earthquakes and disturbances have occurred in this age among the people of the time because of that report, with no benefit gained and no advantage returning. Hence we mentioned in some fatwas: the affirmation of those Adams and seals is not among the rulings of the Law, neither in its beginning nor its end; and according to the view entailed by it, there is no trace of knowledge. “Every faction rejoices in what it has.” God guides whom He wills to a straight path.

Then whoever adduces this report as proof of the possibility of the existence of one like him—may God bless and grant him peace—and of its falling under the divine power, has greatly prolonged the distance, gone far afield, and brought what is foreign to the context and outside the point at issue. For between the two questions there is a vast difference: “How could they attain [it] from a place so far away?” 1.

1 Opposite it, in the margin of the original: “That is, the possibility of one like him—may God bless and grant him peace—being within His, exalted is He, power is established by other proofs besides this proof, even if it did not occur outwardly, in accordance with the divine promise.” “Mawlawee Muhammad 'Abd al-Rasheed Kashmeeree, may God Most High preserve him.”

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Conclusion of the First Part

Stop: This writing was completed, by the help of the Lord of creation, in the month of Rabee' al-Awwal of the year 1291 AH. Its writer, with his right hand, was the one in need of his Master's pardon, the son of His male and female servants, the obscure and hidden Aboo al-Tayyib Siddeeq ibn Hasan ibn 'Alee al-Husaynee al-Qannawjee al-Bukhaaree. May God conceal the faults of his soul and make his morrow better than his yesterday.

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This servant—may God pardon what he has committed and employ him in what He loves and is pleased with—has an active hand and a working right hand in the Islamic sciences, especially exegesis, hadeeth, jurisprudence and their principles, history, and literature, as is evident from his writings. In this latter age, God—exalted is He—has singled him out, through His abundant generosity, to compile the rulings of Islam in the transmitted manner from the Master of mankind and the noble forebears, in a fashion not previously attained by any of the scholars of the Indian lands. God singles out for His mercy whom He wills.

Were I to have upon every place where hair grows ... a tongue, I would not fulfill the due of His praise.

He—glorified and exalted is He—has aided him in acquiring those sciences and their precious books, scarce in existence, through every kind of knowledge and means, inclined toward him the hearts of His friends, bestowed upon him blessings beyond enumeration, and granted him success in preferring truth to creation, the pleasure of the Creator to that of the created, and the true Islamic sciences to philosophical rational disciplines. Thus most of his time and the greater part of his life have passed in studying the Book and the Sunnah and what pertains to them, and in shunning the people of innovation and caprice. He benefited fully from the words of the pious forebears, and drew extensively from the books of the later verifying scholars, until he obtained from them benefits that he is unable to disclose, yields that he cannot indicate, and realities that cannot be expressed except through benefits and yields, and questions for which there are from them proofs for and against. How could it be otherwise? They are beyond the description of describers and beyond the reach of expression. None is guided to the like of their taste and sweetness except a select few of humankind, who have competed with us in grasping structures and taking meanings in a manner that perfects mastery and assent. Praise be to God in every state; He is the Bestower of perfection upon exemplar and non-exemplar alike.

How excellent is what Ibn Khaldoon said: “Verification is scant; the edge of refinement is, for the most part, blunt; error and illusion are kin and companions to people; imitation is a chief and descendant among human beings; dabbling in the sciences is broad and long; the pasture of ignorance among mankind is bleak and ruinous; truth—its authority cannot be resisted; falsehood—its devil is struck by the meteor of critical scrutiny; the transmitter merely dictates and transmits; insight criticizes the sound when it examines closely; and knowledge polishes and burnishes for it the pages of correctness.” End.

In sum, the genuine investigators among the adherents of religions and sects are few; they scarcely exceed the number of fingers, or the motions of grammatical agents. The discerning critic is the balance-scale of his own judgment in exposing the falsity of what they transmit and following what they say. Yet after these there came only an imitator, dull of nature and intellect, or one grown obtuse, who weaves according to that pattern and takes it as his model. Thus he brings images stripped of their matter, pages drawn out from their pillars, and branches of knowledge whose new and old alike are deemed strange by ignorance. They are merely opinions whose principles have not been known, and assertions whose genera have not been considered nor whose differentiae ascertained. In their studies, they repeat verbatim the debated matters that have circulated from of old, in imitation of those rabbis and monks who concerned themselves with them. They neglect the matter of the Book and the Sunna, which arose in their corpus, because they lacked its interpreter; thus their pages become unintelligible in explaining it, and their tongues incapable of elucidating it. Then, when they one day undertake to mention the sunan, they string together their reports without safeguarding their transmission, whether erroneously or correctly. They do not address their beginning, nor mention the cause that raised their banner and manifested their sign, nor the reason for stopping at their limit. The follower of hadeeth therefore remains in need of seeking the conditions of their soundness and weakness and their ranks, investigating the reasons for their being adhered to, set aside, competing, or succeeding one another, and searching for what is convincing concerning their explanation or their mutual proportion.

Therefore, when I examined the books of these people and sounded the depths of yesterday and the heights of today, I awakened the eye of insight from the slumber of heedlessness and sleep. I aspired chiefly to composition on the Book and the Sunna and matters connected with them, though I myself am one who knows best how to bargain despite being destitute. Thus I composed books and treatises on their codification,

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and, to facilitate these difficulties and gain a view of those heights, I assembled volumes and issues. I refined their approaches and brought them nearer to understanding. I have presented what will delight you with the realities and causes of the religion of Islam, and acquaint you with how the people of knowledge entered by its gates, so that you may withdraw your hand from imitation and learn the circumstances of the forebears and imams of the Community before you, and of those after you. So adhere to our works and the works of our shaykhs in every field; you will find them—if God Most High wills—filled, in every coming and going, with pure religion and unalloyed sacred law. Once you have obtained them, you may have no further need, in apprehending the true and correct truth regarding rulings and questions, of a volume or a book—if you are among those who are fair and do not act arbitrarily, who prefer truth to people, do not hesitate, do not fear the blame of any blamer for the sake of God, and abstain from replying to contemporaries. Know that your return is to God; who then shall be your helper? And in the grave is your resting-place—what shall be said of you?

This is the end of the first part of this book. With God is success, and to Him is repentance. The other part follows, if God Most High wills.

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